戴维森 传播中的第三人效果

传播中的第三人效应

戴维森

大约是1949年到1950年左右，普利斯顿大学的一个年轻的历史学家在梳理第二次世界大战美国海军陆战队档案的过程中，发现了一段有趣的内容，激起了他的好奇心。他穿过了走廊，把他的发现告诉了一个更年轻的社会学家：

“你应该懂一些公众舆论的知识。你对这件事怎么看呢？二战期间，在太平洋的硫磺岛上，有一个由白人长官和黑人士兵组成的现役小分队。日本人知道了这个小分队的位置，并派出了飞机去散发传单。这些传单强调的主题是：这是一场白人的战争，日本人和有色人种没有冲突。传单上大概其写着这样的字眼：…不值得为白人丧命。趁着还有机会，赶快退出战争，或者干脆投降。别心存侥幸。?第二天，这个小分队撤退了。”

社会学家问：“你为什么对这件事这么感兴趣呢？”

“因为我完全找不到任何证据能够表明士兵们受到了这种宣传的影响。但可以肯定的是，这种宣传对白人长官起了作用。看起来，这些传单导致了美军人员事实上的洗牌。”

社会学家支支吾吾地谈了一些诸如白人长官可能怀有负疚感，以及军方倾向于采取实际行动来解决问题的托词。但他始终无法摆脱萦绕在他心头的一种感觉：肯定还有些其他的东西在发挥着作用。

几年之后，在调查西德新闻界在波恩（西德首都）外交政策形成中的角色期间，这个社会学家有机会去询问许多记者，他们觉得报纸社论对读者思想的影响有多大。（Davison，1957年）他们最常给出的一种答复是：“社论对你我这样的人没什么影响，但对普通读者的影响可能会很大。”由于无法找到支持以上判断的证据，围绕这条线索的研究最终夭折了。但是研究者深深地记住了，如此之多的记者都确信社论影响了其他人的看法，却不认为他们自己这类人会受影响。

隔了一段时间之后，这个社会学家开始投身于国家大选在当地的初选，在他支持的候选人的组织里担任了一名志愿者。选举日前两天，一份支持竞争对手的传单出现在他的邮筒里。这份传单的质量给他留下了深刻印象，他认为它无疑会夺走许多选票，得采取点应对措施了。来不及细想，他就去他所在党派的当地办公室拿了一堆政治印刷品，花了剩下几天的时间挨家挨户发放。

选举后的非正式分析（在地区这一级别上没有开展系统的调研）显示出，两个阵营的宣传材料都没有对选民产生太大影响。这种结论正如《人民的选择》书中一页所写的一样。这个社会学家（也就是本文的作者）开始扪心自问，为什么自己当时会认为竞争对手的传单非常有效。

上面这些个人经历，也许还有些被遗忘了经历，都指向了一个命题。为了起一个更上口的名称，我们也许可以称它为“第三人效应假说”。总的来说，这个假说预言了人们会倾向于夸大大众传播对其他人看法和行为的影响。尤其是暴露在说服性传播（不管这种传播本身是不是想去进行说服）之下的受众成员中的个体，将会认为这种传播对其他人具有比对自己更大的影响。不管这些个体是不是该信息表面上的受众，他们都认为这种传播会影响其他人，并有

可能会让那些人采取一些行动。于是，这种传播的影响，非但不太可能引起表面上的受众的反应，反而很有可能会引起那些预测或者自以为察觉了其他人反应的人们的反应。

这种还在研究中的现象之所以被称为“第三人效应”，是因为针对“第三人”有两个不同的观察立场。在那些试着去评估某种传播的效果的人眼中，这种传播最强的影响力并非体现在“我”或者“你”身上，而是体现在“他们”——所谓的“第三人”——身上。另一方面，在宣传者或者其他的说服性传播者眼中，“第三人”是那些通过某种方式关注表面上的受众的看法和行为的人。事实上，宣传者可能会尝试着通过在表面上去影响其他人，来操纵那些“第三人”们的行为。

这第二种对“第三人”的定义，也许早已经在出现在那些策划向硫磺岛上的黑人小分队散发传单的日本战略家的脑海里了。他们可能本来就没指望那些传单会对士兵本身产生影响，取而代之的是，试图刺激白人军事长官去采取那些事实上他们显然采取了的行动——即，撤回那支小分队。

这种对日本军事战略家们的推测是有事实依据的。英国和美国在欧洲的攻心战，就使用过非常类似的策略。同盟国远征军最高当局的攻心战师的历史（Bad Homburg，德国，1945年）提到了胡格诺行动——一个通过呼吁德国全体飞行员携机投诚从而暗中破坏德国空军力量

的计划。实施这样的呼吁并不困难。众所周知，同盟国的广播节目是被德国政府严格监听的，并且监测报告会提供给德国所有的政治和军事高层。关于纳粹空军投诚的暗示很多。比如，一个播音员说“滑倒”，就是在暗示有一架在官方报道中被击落的德国飞机，实际上已经在英国安全着陆。可以想象，这些暗示中至少有一些将会被柏林警觉的广播监听者的搜集起来。攻心战师的历史告诉我们：

从这个行动中得到的好处，并不在于投诚飞机的实际数目，而在于它对德国当局可能会对全体飞行员采取的对策的影响……反投诚手段的日益严酷，指示战地警察对所有人投去猜疑的目光——这种做法将会对士气产生严重危害。并且，官员的升迁更多地取决于可靠与否，而非能力高低。(p. 53)

几个世纪以来实干型的说服者，很可能都意识到了“第三人效应”的这一用途。恋人们在谈情说爱的时候，毫无疑问，也经常会表面上装作把注意力放在其他人身上，实际上是想要影响爱人的举动。

原文：

The Third-Person Effect in Communication

W. PHILLIPS DAVISON

In 1949 or 1950, while combing through cartons of U.S. Marine Corps documents from World War II, a young historian at Princeton University came across a series that piqued his curiosity. He stepped across the corridor and described his find to an even younger sociologist:

"You're supposed to know something about public opinion. What do you make of this? There was a service unit consisting of Negro troops with white officers on Iwo Jima Island in the Pacific. The Japanese learned about the location of this unit and sent planes over with propaganda leaflets. These leaflets stressed the theme that this was a white man's war and that the Japanese had no quarrel with colored peoples. They said, more or less, 'Don't risk your life for the white man. Give yourself up at the first opportunity, or just desert. Don't take chances.' The next day that unit was withdrawn."

"Why do you find this so interesting?" asked the sociologist.

"Because I can't find any evidence that the propaganda had an effect on the troops at all. But it sure had an effect on the white officers. The leaflets seem to have caused a substantial reshuffle of personnel."

The sociologist mumbled something about probable guilt feelings on the part of the white officers and a tendency of the military to prefer solutions that involve physical action. But he couldn't escape the feeling that something else was involved.

A few years later, in the course of investigating the role of the West German press in the formation of Bonn's foreign policy, the sociologist had occasion to ask a series of journalists how much influence they thought newspaper editorials had on the thinking of their readers (Davison, 1957). One of the replies given frequently was along the following lines: "The editorials have little effect on people like you and me, but the ordinary reader is likely to be influenced quite a lot." Since evidence to support such a judgment could not be located, this line of inquiry was eventually abandoned, but the researcher remained impressed with the extent to which many journalists were convinced that editorials had an effect on other people's attitudes, while discounting the effect on people like themselves.

Some time after that, the sociologist became involved in the local phase of a national election, serving as a volunteer for his preferred candidate's organization. Two days before the election a leaflet supporting the rival candidate appeared in his mailbox. He was impressed with its quality. It would undoubtedly swing a lot of votes. Some counteraction would have to be taken. Without thinking further, he procured a pile of political literature from his own party's local office and spent the rest of the day distributing it door to door.

Informal postelection analyses (no systematic studies were conducted at the local level) suggested that neither set of propaganda materials had exerted much influence on the

voters. It was as though a page had been taken out of The People's Choice. The sociologist (who is identical with the writer of this article) began to ask himself why he had assumed that the rival candidate's leaflet would be so effective.

These personal experiences, and probably others that have been forgotten, led to the formation of a proposition that, for want of a better label, may be called the "third-person effect hypothesis." In its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves. And whether or not these individuals are among the ostensible au