中英双语新闻
Food politics in America
美国的食品政策
Popped
砰的出现
Soda Politics: Taking on Big Soda (and Winning). By Marion Nestle. Oxford University Press; 508 pages; $29.95 and ￡19.99.
软饮料策略：对付软饮料（然后取得胜利）。作者马里昂?奈斯特。牛津大学出版社。508页。29.95美元，19.99英镑。
MARION NESTLE’S heavyweight polemic against Coca-Cola and PepsiCo comes at an odd moment for the industry. Americans are drinking fewer sugary sodas—in 2012 production was 23% below what it had been a decade earlier. Even sales of diet drinks are losing their fizz, as consumers question the merits of artificial sweeteners. From one angle, it would seem that health advocates such as Ms Nestle have won. Yet in America companies still produce 30 gallons of regular (not diet) fizzy drinks per person per year. In many countries, particularly developing ones, consumption is on the rise.
软饮料工业正处不尴不尬之际，马里昂?奈斯特对口可口可乐以及百事可乐的抨击颇具影响力。越来越少的美国人选择饮用含糖碳酸饮料----与十年前相比，2012年含糖碳酸饮料的生产减少了23%。人们甚至也失去了对膳食饮料的亲睐，因为消费者们对饮料中是否添加人工甜味剂提出了质疑。从某个角度来看，像奈斯特女士这样的健康倡导者似乎赢得了胜利。然而，美国软饮料公司每年生产的常规碳酸饮料（而非膳食饮料）人均多达30加仑。在许多国家，尤其是发展中国家，常规碳酸饮料的消费仍呈上涨趋势。
Ms Nestle, a professor at New York University, is both heartened by recent progress and dissatisfied with it. That is no surprise. Her first book, “Food Politics” (2002), remains a bible for those who bewail the power of food comp anies. In her new book she attacks the industry’s most widely consumed, least healthy product. “Soda Politics”, she says, is a book “to inspire readers to action”. As a rallying cry, it is verbose. When readers learn on page 238 that she will pick up a particular subject in chapter 25, it is with no little dismay that they realize they are only on chapter 17. But what the author wants most is to craft a meticulous guide to the producers’ alleged transgressions, and how to stop them.
对于最近取得的进展，奈斯特女士，这位纽约大学的教授颇受鼓舞，但并不满足于此。这也不足为奇。她的第一本书“粮食政策”依旧被那些哀叹食品企业权势的人们奉为经典。在新书中，奈斯特女士对软饮料行业消费最广，最有害健康的产品进行了抨击。《软饮料策略》这本书旨在激励人们采取行动，奈斯特说到。然而作为战斗口号，却显得颇为繁冗。读者们在第238页了解到奈斯特将在第25章讲述一个特别的主题，却意识到自己才看到第17章，但他们并没有因此而沮丧。作者最想做的是拟定一份详细的指南，指出生产商曾经的过失，并想方设法阻止他们的这种行为。
Ms Nestle says she would have no quibbles with sweet fizzy drinks if they were sipped occasionally, as a treat. However, for millions of people in many countries, they are not. In Mexico companies sold 372 cans of fizzy drinks per person in 2012. About half of Americans do not drink them regularly, but those who do are disproportionately poor, less educated, male, Hispanic or black. Ten per cent of Americans down more than four cans a day.
奈斯特说如果人们只是在吃饭招待的时候偶尔饮用加了甜味剂的碳酸饮料，她不会提出异议。但实际上许多国家，成千上万的人们都在喝这种饮料。2012年，仅墨西哥人均消费的碳酸饮料就高达372罐。大约一半的美国人不会经常性地饮用碳酸饮料，但是那些选择碳酸饮料的人多半是些穷困潦倒，未接受良好教育的西班牙或者黑人男性。百分之十的美国人平均每天要喝掉至少4罐碳酸饮料。
Drinking a lot of sweet fizzy drinks is plainly unhealthy. Unlike a Big Mac, they have no nutritional value; nor do their calories satisfy hunger. One large study found that for each can added to a person’s daily diet, the risk of diabetes jumped by 22%. There are also links between sugar and heart disease, stroke and
cancer. Drinking lots of sodas imposes clear costs on individuals, Ms Nestle argues, but it has a broader cost, too. American taxpayers subsidise corn production (and thereby corn syrup) and let the poor use government food vouchers to buy fizzy drinks. More important, taxpayers foot the health bill for those who develop chronic disease.
很显然，过度饮用碳酸饮料对身体健康是有害的。与巨无霸不同的是，这些碳酸饮料毫无营养价值，它们产生的热量也无法抵抗饥饿。一项大型研究表明，如果在日常饮食中加入碳酸饮料，那么人们罹患糖尿病的风险就会增加22%。心脏病，中风以及癌症与过多的糖分摄入不无关系。奈斯特说，大量饮用碳酸饮料会增加个人开支，但实际上个人花费要远大于此。美国的纳税人为玉米生产做出了贡献（也就是为玉米糖浆的生产做出了贡献），同时，他们让穷人用政府提供的食品券来购买碳酸饮料。更重要的是，纳税人为那些罹患慢性疾病的人支付医疗帐单。
Encouraging people to drink fewer fizzy drinks, however, is fiendishly difficult. Soda companies spend billions on marketing; it is a tribute to the admen that Coca-Cola is one of the world’s best-loved brands, despite selling what is essentially fattening sugar-water. (Think of Coca-Cola’s encouragements to “open happiness” and PepsiCo’s exuberant spokeswoman, Beyoncé Knowles.) Once people get used to consuming sugary drinks, they are loth to give them up. There is evidence suggesting that sugar is addictive—some laboratory animals prefer sugar to cocaine.
然而，鼓励人们尽量少喝碳酸饮料却出奇的难。碳酸饮料企业在营销上花费巨资。尽管可口可乐售卖的实际上是令人增肥的糖水饮料，但可口可乐无疑是世界上最受消费者青睐的品牌之一。而这对于广告人而言，是件可喜可贺的事情。（想想可口可乐颇具鼓动性的广告语“开启幸福”，百事可乐活力四射的代言人碧昂丝?诺利斯。）人们一旦习惯了消费含糖饮料，便很难戒掉。有证据表明食糖是会上瘾的----与可卡因相比，实验室的动物们更喜欢食糖。
Most interesting, fizzy-drink companies are skilled at swatting away attempts at regulation. Ms Nestle describes an extraordinarily broad team of allies. That includes obvious friends, such as employees, bottlers and distributors, as well as the restaurants, cinemas, shops and sports stadiums that sell their products. But the companies are also astute philanthropists. When Michael Bloomberg, then mayor of New York, tried to block the use of government vouchers to buy sodas in 2010, the congressional black caucus was among those to lob by against it. The caucus’s foundation has received money from both Coke and Pepsi. In 2011 Philadelphia was considering a soda tax. After the soda lobby offered a big donation to the city’s children’s hospital, the idea fizzled out.
更有趣的是，碳酸饮料企业对规避规范化的尝试颇有一套。奈斯特将其描述为一个非比寻常的庞大联盟。很显然，这个联盟包括了这些企业的盟友们，比如雇员，瓶装工，经销商，那些出售他们商品的饭店，电影院，商店以及体育场。但这些碳酸饮料企业同时也是非常精明的慈善家。2010年，当时的纽约市市长迈克尔?布隆伯格试图阻止人们用政府代金券购买碳酸饮料，但却遭到了包括美国国会黑人同盟在内的多数人的反对。2011年，费城考虑是否要征收碳酸饮料税，但在碳酸饮料游说集团出资捐助了一家当地的儿童医院之后，这项提议未能实施。
Coca-Cola and PepsiCo do have a few notable adversaries. Mr Bloomberg, a billionaire, remains their single biggest foe. It is telling that in two rare instances when a soda tax has been passed—in Berkeley, California and in Mexico—it was with the help of cash from Mr Bloomberg. Drinks companies must also reckon with a small army of health advocates, among which Ms Nestle is a major-general.
可口可乐和百事可乐确实有一些颇为出名的对手。布隆伯格，这位亿万富翁是他们最大的对手。据说在两个颇为罕见的通过征收碳酸饮料税的例子中----一个是加利福尼亚的伯克利市，另一个是墨西哥----都是在布隆伯格的资金帮助下通过了碳酸饮料税法案。饮料公司还得去对付那些以奈斯特为首的健康军团。
With the slow decline of soda in America, she and her allies are advancing. Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are peddling healthier drinks, such as bottled water. However, as they try to face down a long-term
threatwhile maintaining near-term profits, they are still pushing their syrupy fare.
随着美国人慢慢地拒绝碳酸饮料，奈斯特和她的盟友们正向成功一步步迈进。可口可乐和百事可乐正忙于推销更健康的饮料，如瓶装水。然而，他们仍旧努力推动碳酸饮料事业的发展，试图在维持短期利润的同时，努力克服长期以来的威胁。
Ms Nestle is impatient. To the casual reader, her suggestions can seem extreme. She writes enthusiastically about adorning soda cans with warning labels, such as pictures of a diabetic’s foot ulcer. She suggests that parents should teach their children about fizzy drinks by gently boiling down a Coke or a Pepsi into sludge, which sounds rather fun, and asking them to calculate the precise length of grocery shelves bearing sodas, which sounds less so. This zeal threatens to overshadow her stronger points: fizzy drinks offer no nutritional benefit and impose clear costs—on individuals’ health and on society.
奈斯特女士可没那么好的耐心。对于一般的读者，她给的建议似乎很极端。在书中她强烈建议碳酸饮料瓶上面必须贴有糖尿病患者脚部溃烂诸如此类的警示标志。她建议父母们在向孩子们介绍碳酸饮料时，将可口可乐和百事可乐说成是垃圾，这看上去颇为有趣，并要求孩子们去算算杂货店摆满碳酸饮料的货架究竟有多长，这听上去似乎没那么好笑了。这份热情让斯耐特关于碳酸饮料的观点显得不那么重要了：碳酸饮料没有任何营养价值，对个人的健康没有好处，而且还增加了社会的负担。
Luxury goods 奢侈品
Million dollar mastiffs
价值百万的藏獒
1 CHEN BINQI grows and sells abalone, adelicious kind of mollusc, in Dongshan, a seaside resort in the southern province of Fujian. He says that from 2010 to 201
2 the price never dropped below 50 yuan ($7.7) for 500 grams on tomb-sweeping day, a public holiday and one of the busiest days for tourists. In 201
3 it fell to 40 yuan, which meant most breeders were selling below cost. “Now it’s down to 30-something, which isunbearable.”
鲍鱼是一种美味的软体动物。陈斌奇（音译）是南部省份福建海边胜地东山一家养殖厂的老板，负责鲍鱼的养殖和出售。他说，2010年到2012年间鲍鱼在清明节的价格每斤从未低过50元（7.7美元），而清明节作为公众假期是旅游业最繁忙的时节之一。但到了2013年，鲍鱼的价格下降到了40元每斤，很多养殖户都以低于成本的价格销售。“现在价格只有三十多块，这个价格低得不能忍。”
2 In the neighbouring province of Guangdong, Lin Gongxi has been carving jade for 50 years in Jieyang, China’s jade capital.When business was good, he told Southern Metropolis Daily, he used to go to bed at 2am and get up at 6am. Now he often has no work for eight days out of ten. Half the shops at Jieyang’s jade-trading centre are empty. Rents have fallen by three-quarters. 在邻省广东素有“中国翡翠之都”之称的揭阳市，林恭喜（音译）已经从事翡翠雕刻工作长达50年。他告诉南方都市报记者，当行业景气时，他每天深夜两点睡觉，早上六点就要起床。而现在，十天中的八天他都没有工作可做。揭阳翡翠交易中心近半数的商铺都已经人去楼空，而店铺的租金已经下降了四分之三。
3 In Beijing’s Panjiayuan market, Wang Lin sells copies of Ming and Qing dynasty carved furniture. Same story. Businesspeople used to order ten-piece suites of office furniture; he sold them as fast as his carpenters could make them, sometimes faster (there was a waiting list). Now, prices have halved and he “can shift maybe a couple of chairs out of ten”.
北京的王林（音译）在潘家园市场销售仿明清家具，而他的命运也和上面几位差不多。商人曾经对十件套办公家具情有独钟。供货商出厂一套，王林就能销售一套，甚至有的时候会出现供不应求的现象（还有等待发货的买家名单）。虽然现在这些家具的价格下降了一半，但他在十把椅子中只能卖出两三把。
4 China is the world’s biggest market forluxury goods, accounting (by some measures) for half of all luxury spending.The slowdown in the growth of China’s economy and househo ld incomes is usually seen as bad for rich-country purveyors of luxuries such as perfumes, golfclubs, art and
the like. Which it is: LVMH, a producer of champagne and handbags, recently closed three shops in China, while Christie’s annual auctionof Asian 20th-century and contemporary art in Hong Kong earned only HK$508m($66m) in November, down from HK$935m in 2013.
中国作为全球最大奢侈品的市场，据某些数据报道显示，占了全球奢侈品销售总额的一半。中国经济增长的放缓和家庭收入增长的停滞对于富裕国家的奢侈品厂商来说通常都不是一件好事，其中就包括香水制造商、高尔夫俱乐部、艺术等等类似的产业。举几个例子：路易威登是生产香槟和手提包的奢侈品厂商，而最近路易威登关了三家中国境内的门店。克里斯蒂拍卖行11月在香港拍卖20世纪亚洲以及当代艺术品的收入仅为5.08亿港元（6600万美元），而在2013年该数字为9.35万元。
5 But the woes of Western vanitymongers aretrifling compared with those of their Chinese counterparts. Prices of jade and Tibetan mastiffs, for example, have dropped by half or more. Hundreds of businesses have gone bust. This owes as much to politics as economics.
但这些外国虚荣贩子的遭遇相比他们的中国同行来说就太轻微了。举个例子，翡翠和藏獒的价格已经下降了一半或者更多。过百数相关企业倒闭。但在此之中，除了经济因素，政治因素也发挥着一样重要的作用。That doggy in the window 橱窗里的狗狗
6 Take Tibetan mastiffs, a breed of enormous sheep-guarding dog (one is pictured above, on sale). These were the must-have status symbol for China’s new billionaires in the late 2000s. Three years ago ordinary Tibetan mastiffs could fetch around $20,000. Now they sell for a tenth of that. Earlier this year an animal-welfare group rescued 20 abandoned mastiffs from the back of a lorry, which was taking them to a slaughter house to be sold for leather and meat—for a mere $5 each.藏獒是一种体型庞大的牧羊犬（如上图所示，该藏獒被低价出售）。在新世纪前十年的后半段，藏獒对于中国新晋的亿万富豪们来说是必须拥有的身份象征。3年前，一只普通的藏獒价格能够高达20000美元。而现在价格仅为当时的十分之一。今年早些时候，一个动物关爱组织在通往屠宰场的路上从货车车厢中救下了20只被遗弃的藏獒，原本等待他们的是被宰杀后分解为毛皮和狗肉出售，而售价仅为每只5美元。
7 Tibetan mastiffs were a fad for plutocrats,usually bought as status-enhancing guard dogs. But demand for most other Chinese luxuries depends on a culture of gift-giving. Every transaction must bemarked by a present: jade, tea, a meal. One billionaire, Hong Weihua, even paid for a delegation of officials from his hometown to visit America (quitelegally).藏獒通常作为提升身份地位的看门犬，是富豪兴起时的玩物。但对于其他大多数中国人来说，对于奢侈品的需求源于中国特有的送礼文化。每项交易都以送礼为特征，包括翡翠、茶叶或者饭局。亿万富翁洪维华甚至出资资助家乡的官员代表团到美国考察（但这是合法行为）。
8 Since 2013 the anti-corruption campaign ofXi Jinping, China’s president, has made conspicuous consumption politicallysuspect and reined in the practice of lavishing gifts on officials. Tea used tobe a favourite present, especially Pu’er, a fermented and aged variety from
thesouth-western province of Yunnan. The price of top-of-the-line Golden tea fromthe Tae tea company, the world’s largest Pu’er maker, fell from 917 yuan per357 grams in March 2014 to 512 yuan, before rallying a bit (see chart). Thepresident of the Yunnan Tea Association told the Kunming Daily that, after a boom and bust, the teabusiness was entering “a new normal” (a term popularised by Mr Xi, who uses itto describe slower growth of the economy as a whole). This means lower pricesand more modest sales.
自2013年，国家主席习近平的反腐运动让大手脚的消费成为政治上的黑点，也禁止了官员之间送大礼的行为。茶叶曾经是最受人喜爱的礼物，特别是西南省份云南产出醇厚的普洱。全球最大的普洱厂商塔尔茶叶公司生产的顶级金叶价格从2014年3月的每克917元下降到512元(后来略有上升，如图)。云南茶业协会主席告诉昆明日报记者，在经历快速发展和逐渐衰落后，茶业正在进入“一个行业新常态”（这个术语因习近平而广为人知，他用词来形容经济增长总体放慢）。这意味行业更低的价格和更少的销售量。
9 The abalone business shows that it is Mr Xi’s rule against “extravagant eating and drinking”, rather than a lack ofcash, that lies behind the luxury squeeze. Mr Chen, the seafood-dealer inFujian, says abalone is not especially pricey, but because it is seen as aluxury “sales took a big hit”. Of the breeders he knows, 40% quit during 2013and 2014.
鲍鱼养殖的遭遇很好地说明了奢侈品产业的衰落背后不是现金的缺少，而是习近平反贪行动中对于“挥霍吃喝”的管制。福建海鲜商贩陈先生表示，鲍鱼的价格其实不是特别地昂贵，但因为人们都认为鲍鱼是奢侈品，因此鲍鱼的销售额遭受冲击。陈先生表示他知道的同行中有40%在2013年和2014年推出了鲍鱼养殖。
10 At the top end of the mastiff business, itis not so bleak. In 2011 a coal baron is said to have paid 10m yuan ($1.5m) forBig Splash, a Tibetan mastiff puppy. In 2014 a property developer paid 12m yuanfor a dog, making it the world’s most expensive canine. Han Lianming, a mastiffbreeder near Beijing, says the market for such finest-quality dogs still looksgood. “Someone offered me 20m yuan for that one. It was crazy,” he sayscontentedly, p ointing to a vast ball of russet fur and teeth that is lumberingaround the courtyard (the deal did not come off). A select few millionairesappear immune to the anti-corruption campaign and unfazed by dog-breeders’efforts during the boom years to boost supp ly by crossbreeding. This diminishedthe rarity-value of mastiffs, but it also produced some highly sought-afterspecimens.
但高端的藏獒买卖则没有像其他产业那么惨淡。2011年，一个煤矿大亨据说用1000万购买了一只藏獒亚种大飞溅。2014年，一个地产商以1200万的价格购买了一只宠物狗，创造了全球最贵宠物狗记录。韩连明（音译）是北京附近的藏獒养殖户，他表示优质的藏獒的是市场前景依然很好。他开心地指着一只身形巨大、毛发蓬松、牙齿锋利、在院子里疯跑的藏獒说“有人出2000万来买那只藏獒，简直是疯了。”（这项交易最后没有发生）有少数富翁对于激烈的反贪行动无动于衷，也对藏獒养殖户在全民养獒时交叉配种以提高产量的做法没有表示。这样的做法让藏獒的珍稀性不再，但同时也导致一些广受欢迎品种的出现。
11 The jade market, however, has little goodnews to report. Yu Ming, the director of the jade committee of the ChinaTraditional Culture Promotion Council, a state-run body, says that though salesat big auction houses are holding up, the retail business is plummeting. In bigcities such as Beijing they have fallen by 10-20%. In second- and third-tiercities (such as provincial capitals), he says, sales are down by 40-50%. In2013 there was a spike in the price of raw jade from neighbouring Myanmar, whenpolitical violence briefly disrupted supplies. Mr Yu says many thought theconflict would lead to higher prices in China. But to everyone’s surprise theretail price actually fell. “There just isn’t that big a market any more,” helaments.
然而翡翠市场却很少会传出好消息。政府出资建立的中国传统文化促进会翡翠委员会的主席于明（音译）表示尽管大型拍卖会中翡翠的价格持续上升，但翡翠零售业却不断地走向低谷。在北京一类的大城市中，翡翠的销售量下降了10%-20%。他说，在例如一些省会的二、三线城市中，销售量甚至下降了40%-50%。2013年，因为邻国缅甸政治动乱干扰翡翠的供应，从缅甸进口的翡翠原料有过一段时间的增长。于先生说，有很多人认为这次的动乱会导致中国翡翠价格的上升。但出乎所有人的意料的是，翡翠价格在实际是下跌的。他哀怨道：“这个市场只是不再像从前一样大了而已。”
Nigeria’s government
尼日利亚政府
At work at last
After sixmonths, Nigeria’s president no longer leads alone
过了六个月，尼日利亚总统才总算结束了孤立无援的窘境。
THE law was laid down for Nigeria’s ministers when they were sworn into office last week. No
corruption, their austere president, Muhammadu Buhari, told them. Obey the law and work together, because expectations are high. Behave in keeping with the times. Refrain from gaudy displays of wealth (“Not that some of us have much to display,” one appointee laments). It has taken almost six months for the former dictator, now elected, to install his cabinet, but for those who made the cut his message is simple: winning high office is no longer a license to rob the public purse. Unlike many of their predecessors, the new ministers must prioritize reform.
当尼日利亚新一届政府部长们于上周宣誓就职的时候，一项针对他们的清规戒律也开始生效。禁止贪污，以严厉著称的总统穆罕默德?布哈里如此告诫他们。民众对这届政府抱有很高的期望，因此他们必须遵纪守法、众志成城。行为举止要与时俱进。抑制铺张显摆之风（“并不是说我们有很多财产可以显摆”一位被任命的部长面露难色地说道）。这位前独裁者重新当选后已经花了接近六个月的时间才完成内阁的组建。但是对那些成功进入内阁的人来说，布哈里想传递的讯息很简单：身居要职不再是高官肆意鱼肉百姓的免死金牌。与他们的诸位前任不同的是，新一届的部长们必须把改革放在首位。
Many observers are optimistic that they can do so. Mr Buhari’s cabinet is s maller than that of the previous president, Goodluck Jonathan, with 25 principal ministers and 12 junior ones. Several of his senior appointees have good track records. Babatunde Fashola, the respected former governor of Lagos state, has been handed a monumental portfolio combining power, public works and housing. Another ex-governor, Kayode Fayemi (pictured, left, with the president), is charged with developing mining operations as Nigeria rushes to broaden its economy away from oil. Fans of a third seasoned politician, Rotimi Amaechi, who won the transport post, say he has delivered roads despite accusations of corruption, which he denies.
许多观察家对此持乐观态度。布哈里总统的内阁由25位首席部长和12位初级部长组成，比他的前任古德拉克?乔纳森总统的内阁要小一些。而且有数位首席部长拥有良好的履历记录。备受尊敬的前拉各斯州州长巴巴图内德?法肖拉（Babatunde Fashola）被任命为电力、工程和住房部长，这可是一个肥差。另一位前州长，卡耶德?法耶米（Kayode Fayemi）（合照中站在总统左侧这位）奉命发展采矿业，因为现下的尼日利亚亟需拓宽经济发展的路子，使其不过度依赖于石油产业。作为政治资历排第三的老练政治家，罗蒂米?阿玛奇赢得了交通部长的宝座，他的支持者认为尽管面临贪污的指控（他本人矢口否认），但他还是确保了多条公路的顺利完工。
Yet the president has failed to please all as he juggles the demands of his party and people. His decision to keep the oil post for himself, while appointing the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s new head as his deputy, was designed to keep the valuable resource in hands he can trust. But it raises concerns over the centralization of power. Ethnic groups of the southeast who mostly voted for Mr Jonathan in this year’s election are feeling neglected. Critics also fret over an absence of desperately needed financial expertise.
但是，当布哈里总统将自己的政党和选民的需求玩弄于鼓掌之中的时候，他势必难以取悦所有人。他决定由自己兼任石油部长，并任命尼日利亚国家石油公司的新任总裁为他的副手，其目的是为了把有价值的资源掌握在他的亲信手中。这种任人唯亲的做法引起了人们对中央集权的担忧。东南部的大部分部族在今年的选举中站在了乔纳森一边，他们感到自己的利益被忽视。评论家们也为布哈里未能任命一位亟需的懂业务的财政部长而感到深深的忧虑。
Africa’s biggest economy, which relies on oil for 70% of its revenue, is sputtering as prices fall. Economic policy has been adrift since Mr Buhari came to power, and investors complain about the central bank’s use of trade controls and import restrictions. However, the new finance minister, an accountant who cleaned up the books of one of Nigeria’s smaller states, is poorly qualified for the job. Her counterpart in the investment ministry is a respected businessman, but he may lack the clout to stand up to a president with statist leanings. “It’s a government
with local professionals and without su perstars,” says Shehu Sani, a senator of the ruling party. 尼日利亚是非洲最大的经济体，但它的财政收入有七成来自石油产业，随着油价的下行，该国的经济也后继乏力。上台以来，布哈里至今尚未敲定他的经济政策，投资者们则对央行采取的贸易控制和进口限制政策怨声载道。但是，新任财政部长（曾在尼日利亚某个较小的州政府从事财政工作）的资历远远不能胜任这份工作。她在投资部的同僚倒是一位受人尊敬的商人，但是他的影响力也许还不足以对抗这位秉承中央集权论的总统。“这届政府有的只是一些地方上的专业人士，没有什么有影响力的政坛超级巨星，”执政党的参议院施胡?萨尼说道。
Still, Nigerians find much to be happy about. Boko Haram, an insurgent Islamist group, has been weakened during Mr Buhari’s half-year at the helm (though bombs this week killed 43 people), and power supplies are somewhat more reliable. A bigger budget has been outlined for 2016, though it is unclear how it will be financed, and recurrent spending will be pared back. More heartening is the president’s crusade against corruption.
不过，尼日利亚人民还有许多值得高兴的事情。布哈里执掌国家权力半年来，他已经成功地削弱了博科圣地（一个伊斯兰叛乱组织）（尽管该组织本周又炸死了43个人），而且国内的电力供应稍微可靠了点。布哈里已经为2016年勾勒了一个更大的预算（尽管目前还不清楚钱从哪来），而且周期性的开支将得到削减。总统的反贪污运动更加鼓舞人心。
Staff have been fired from the state oil company and customs department. Officials are tackling smuggling along leaky borders. To reduce fraud, an opaque network of government bank accounts has been replaced by a centralized system. Several politicians, including the president of the Senate, a former oil minister and an ex-national security adviser, are under investigation. Meanwhile, biometric registration at banks should expose more money laundered by civil servants and their stooges. High-rollers are on their best behavior. Lamudi, a property company, reports a slowdown in expensive sales, partly explained by the fact that the rich would rather not be seen splurging.
一些有问题的雇员已经被国家石油公司和海关部门扫地出门。公务员们沿着漏洞百出的边境线上打击走私。为了减少欺诈案件，原来不透明的政府银行账户网络已经被一套集中式的系统所取代。多位政客正在接受调查，包括参议院主席、一位前石油部长、以及一位前国家安全顾问。同时，通过在银行系统推行生物统计登记，使公务员及其傀儡的洗钱行为无处藏匿。挥金如土的豪绅们不得不夹着尾巴过日子。Lamudi（一家产权公司）报告称其奢侈消费增长出现放缓的态势，一定程度上是因为富人们宁可不被人看到他们大肆挥霍
European history
欧洲史
A grim half-century
黑暗的五十年
To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949. By Ian Kershaw. Viking; 624 pages; $35. Allen Lane; ￡30.《地狱重生：欧洲 1914-1949》作者：伊恩·科修； 624页；美国版维京出版社售价 $35 ；英国版奥利雷恩出版社售价￡30
FOR Europe, as Ian Kershaw notes in this magisterial history, which came out in Britain in September and is just being published in America, the 20th century was a game of two halves. The first saw a cataclysm that brought down empires, plunged the continent into a deep slump and culminated in the horrors of the second world war. At least for Western Europe, the second was, in contrast, a triumph of peace and prosperity. That distinction may explain why Mr Kershaw has sensibly divided his original assignment to write the 20th-ce ntury volume in the Penguin “History of Europe” series into two books, of which this is the first.
对欧洲而言，正如伊恩·科修在这部已于9月份在英国上市、目前正在美国印刷的权威史中所言，20世纪是一场上下半场的博弈。上半场看到的一场带来了多个帝国崩溃、令这块大陆陷入了一场深度衰退、最后在第二次世界大战的恐怖中达到了高潮的灾难。与之相比，下半场，至少对西欧来说，是一场和平与繁荣的胜利。这种对比可能正是科修明智地将其为企鹅“欧洲史”丛书撰写20世纪卷的最初打算分解为了上下两册的原因。此书为上册。
His broad picture of what went wrong in Europe in the 20th century is built around four related points. First was the rise of ethnic nationalism, something that helped to doom the multinational empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottomans. Next were demands for territorial revision, between France and Germany, in central and eastern Europe and all over the Balkans. Third was class conflict, as workers and a nascent socialist movement flexed their muscles against bosses and the traditional aristocratic ruling class. And fourth was the crisis of capitalism, which struck home in the early 1930s and contributed hugely to the rise of Nazism.
他的欧洲在20世纪怎么了的广阔画卷是围绕着四个相关要点构建起来的。一是促成了奥匈帝国、沙俄帝国和奥斯曼土耳其帝国等多民族帝国走向末日的民族国家主义的兴起，二是法德之间、中欧和东欧各国以及所有巴尔干国家对于重新划分领土的要求，三是随着工人阶层和初生的社会主义运动对资本家和传统贵族统治阶层展示力量而出现的阶级冲突，四是在三十年代初期重创了各个国家并对纳粹主义的兴起起了推波助澜作用的资本主义危机。
Mr Kershaw, an acknowledged expert on Germany and author of the best biography of Adolf Hitler, naturally places the two world wars at the heart of his narrative, with Germany standing condemned as the main cause of both. That is a more controversial position to take for the first than the second, but on the whole Mr Kershaw justifies his claim. He also delineates cogently and chillingly the way in which the collapse of the tsarist empire, brought about to a large extent by Russia's military and political setbacks during the first world war, led to the Bolshevik triumph and the creation of the Soviet Union, which in almost all respects was worse than what went before. 作为一位公认的德国问题专家和希特勒传记最佳版本的作者，科修自然把两次世界大战作为其叙述的中心。具体地说，德国被当做两次世界大战的主要原因而受到了重点的指责。这是一种对第一次世界大战较之对第二次世界大战所采取的更有争议性的立场。但是，科修基本上证明了他的观点。他还冷静而且中肯叙述了在很大程度上是拜第一次世界大战期间的军事和政治失败所赐的沙俄帝国的崩溃是如何导致了几乎在所有方面都是前所未有的糟糕的布尔什维克的胜利和苏联的建立。
The author shows how the failings of that first war's victors—the reparations fiasco, the Versailles treaty, America's withdrawal into isolationism—laid the ground for a path that led inexorably to the second. But he also insists that the path was not inevitable. The Locarno treaty of 1925 between Germany, France, Britain, Belgium and Italy, and the entry of Weimar Germany into the League of Nations, could, just about, have led to something rather like the rehabilitation of West Germany in the 1950s. What really took Europe back to the horrors that culminated in another war was economic collapse after 1929. Just as after the recent financial crisis of 2007-08, it was the political right, not the left, that benefited most from this collapse. In Europe that ultimately meant a snuffing out of democracy and the rise of the extreme right in Spain, much of central Europe and, above all, in Germany.
作者展示了第一场战争的胜利者的错误——赔款的彻底失败、凡尔赛条约以及美国退回孤立主义——如何为一条不可逆转的通向第二场战争的道路打下了基础。但是，他也坚持认为，这条道路不是不可避免的。1925年的法、德、英、比、意《洛迦诺公约》和魏玛共和国加入国际联盟曾经差一点就带来了类似于西德在五十年代的复兴。真正将欧洲拉回到在另一场战争中达到高潮的恐怖的是1929年之后的经济大衰退。正如2007-08年金融危机之后那样，那次衰退的最大获益者政治上的右派，而不是左派。在欧洲，其终极义
就是一次民主的奄奄一息以及极右翼在西班牙、大多数中欧国家，以及最后在德国的兴起。
Mr Kershaw's focus on Germany inevitably means a few weaknesses elsewhere. His strictures against the other great European tyrant of the period, Josef Stalin, are softer than those against Hitler. Indeed, he somewhat underplays the horrific history of the Soviet Union from the late 1920s up to the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. He has little to say on Turkey: no mention of Field-Marshal Allenby nor T.E. Lawrence, little on Kemal Ataturk. His treatment of the military story of the two world wars is succinct almost to the point of cursoriness, but this ground is well-tilled in other books. It is also obvious from his narrative that he is more interested in politics and war than in social, demographic and cultural changes, though he dutifully covers these too.
科修之于德国的关注不可避免地意味着其他方面的不足。较之希特勒，他对那个时代的欧洲的另一位大独裁者约瑟夫·斯大林的责难相对和缓。实际上，他多少弱化了苏联从二十年代末期到1939年苏德协议这段时间的恐怖历史。他对土耳其着墨不多：没有提及艾伦比元帅、T.E劳伦斯和凯末尔·阿塔蒂尔克。他对两次世界大战战事的处理，简明扼要，一带而过，好在这个领域已在另外几本书中中得到了较好的发掘。从他的叙述来看，他对政治和战争的兴趣明显地超过了对社会变迁、人口变动以及文化变革的兴趣，尽管他也尽职尽责地论述了这些内容。
As in previous volumes in the series, the editors have decided to dispense with footnotes and sources (though there is a useful bibliography). That may be understandable in a history aimed more at the general public than at fellow academics, but it is still annoying. Yet this is a worthy, impressive and well-written addition to a series that has become the definitive history of Europe for our times—and one that whets the appetite for his next volume.
正如这套丛书中的前几卷那样，编辑们已经决定放弃注释和来源（尽管有一个有用的参考文献）。对一套以普通读者而不是专家学者为对象的历史丛书来说，也许，这是可以理解的。但是，仍然会让人感到不适。然而，该书却是对一套已经成为我们时代的权威欧洲史丛书的一个有价值的、能给读者留下深刻印象的、质量上乘的补充——同时，它也是能吊起读者对下册的胃口的一本书。
From the print edition: Books and arts
Shanxi province 山西省
King Coal’s misrule 煤炭王的暴政
The rise and fall of a corrupt coal-fuelled economy
腐化燃煤经济的沉浮
1 IT TAKES half an hour to walk down 1,400 rickety wooden steps from a pithead of Jinhuagong mine to the coal face, 400 metres below. At the top, grimy miners tramp home. At the bottom stand a theodolite, a flame-proof telephone and a double-drum electrical traction shearer—a behemoth of a machine designed to chew up the coal face and excrete its fragments onto a conveyor belt. 从晋华宫矿的矿井井口到400米深的煤层要经过1400阶摇摇晃晃的木梯，而走这一趟需要1个半小时。在地面上，满身煤污的矿工迈着沉重的脚步回家。在矿井底，你能看到经纬仪、防火电话以及双滚筒电子牵引采煤机，这种巨型机械用于处理表层煤矿，并将粉碎后的产物放到传送带上。
2 But the pithead, in the northern province of Shanxi near its coal capital, Datong, is not operational. It wa s closed in 2012 and converted into a tourist attraction (with a theme: “the glory of Datong coal”). Perhaps put off by the trek, on most days visitors are rare. The mine’s state-owned operator, Datong Coal Mining Group, is trying to revive its fortunes by diversifying into tourism. It is not proving easy. Its fumbled attempts to reinvent itself symbolise the problems Shanxi as a whole is facing.
但在中国北方省份山西省的煤矿中心大同市附近，有的煤矿已经不再生产。该煤矿在2012年停止生产，但
摇身一变成为游览景点（主打理念是“大同煤的荣光”）。但可能是因为路途坚信，在多数日子里游客数量都很少。该煤矿由国有企业大同煤矿集团运营，集团希望通过加入旅游业的元素来多元化企业财富。但事情没有这么简单，从大同煤矿集团对自我道路的摸索，我们正好可以看到山西作为一个煤矿大省现在所面临的问题。
3 As China slows, many economists pin their hopes for continued growth on poorer inland provinces. By taking advantage of cheap labour and land, the theory goes, these places should be able to grow more quickly than richer coastal areas. Shanxi, 250 miles (400km) east of Beijing, would seem a good candidate for catch-up growth. It is relatively poor, with a GDP per person of 35,000 yuan ($5,500), or 75% of the national average. It has a population of 36m people, about the same as Canada’s, as well as respected universities and good transport links with the coast. It ought to be steaming ahead. Instead, last year, it had the slowest growth of any province: just 4.9%. In the first nine months of 2015, this slowed to only 2.8% compared with the same period a year earlier. Only Liaoning province in the north-eastern rustbelt fared worse.
因为中国经济增长放缓，许多经济学家将实现持续增长的希望放在了不太发达的内陆省份。根据他们的理论，这些较落后地区因为低价的人工和土地，能实现比较为富裕的沿海地区更快的经济发展。山西位于北京往西250英里（400公里）的地方，山西的经济发展或许是弥补中国经济放缓的发动机。山西省相较不太富裕，年人均GDP为350000元（5500美元），只有全国平均水平的75%。山西省人口高达3600万，数量与加拿大相当。同时在山西省内有着和沿海地区一样有名的大学，且山西省与沿海地区的交通方便。这么一来，山西经济应该一路向前。但相反的是，去年山西的经济增长位列所有省份的末尾，仅有4.9%。同步去年同一时期，在2015年前九个月，山西的经济增长放缓至仅有2.8%。在“锈带”省份中，仅有东北省份辽宁的表现比山西差。
4 Three factors explain Shanxi’s failings: coal, corruption and construction. The province is the historic centre of China’s coal industry. Though its output was overtaken by that of neighbouring Inner Mongolia in 2009, Shanxi still produces a quarter of the country’s coal. About 60% of provincial GDP is tied to the black stuff.
山西的经济困难有三个原因：煤、贪、建。山西是中国煤矿业的历史中心。尽管山西的煤炭产量在2009年已经被邻省内蒙古，这一数字依然占了全国煤炭产量的四分之一。该省60%的GDP都和这个黑家伙有关。
5 The business boomed in the 2000s thanks to soaring energy demand (see chart) and the freeing of coal prices, which had been kept artificially low. But the boom was short-lived. Worried by pollution, the central government began trying to reduce China’s coal use. Shanxi has been taking the hit. Capital investment in the province’s coal ind ustry fell last year by 6%. The local government says it will not approve construction of new mines for the next five years. But shrugging off coal dependence is hard. Ignoring its own pledge, Shanxi approved 24 new coal projects in the first nine months of this year, more than any other province.
因为能源价格上涨以及一直被人为设置低价（如图）的燃煤价格放开，煤产业在21世纪初蓬勃发展。但这个蓬勃发展仅是昙花一现。中央政府出于对环境污染的担忧，开始减少国内煤炭使用量，山西经济开始遭受冲击。当地政府宣布在接下来五年内不允许新建煤矿，对山西煤炭产业的资本投资去年下降了6%。但摆脱经济对煤炭的依赖实属不易。山西省政府没有按照说的话做，在今年前九个月里就批准新开了24个煤矿项目，是各省级行政区中最多的。
6 And now prices are falling as China’s economy slows and the drivers of growth change to less-coal-consuming ones, such as services. China’s benchmark coal price was 374 yuan a tonne at the end of October, a 27% decline so far this year. Local prices for unwashed, low-quality coal have fallen further still. Because so many of Shanxi’s mines are old they are relatively expensive to run. Most are losing money.
而现在，煤炭价格随着中国经济增长放缓而下架，同时增长的驱动力向低能耗的产业转移，例如服务业。10月末，中国的煤炭基准价是374元每吨，该数字今年以来已经下降了27%。而当地未经处理的低质煤价格下降的幅度更大。此外许多山西的煤矿因为开采时间久，运营成本相对较高。许多煤矿都在赔钱。
7 The response has been a wave of consolidation. In 2008 the province had 2,600 coal mines. Many of these were small privately owned collieries, at which safety standards were usually atrocious. Most of the private ones have been closed or taken over by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The number of mines has fallen by almost two-thirds. Safety standards have improved considerably. 面对这些困境，山西的煤炭厂商做出的反应是大范围的合并。2008年，山西省境内有2600个煤矿。其中大多数为私人所有，其环境安全堪忧。现在大多数的私营煤矿都被取缔或者由大型国有企业收购。煤矿的数量下降了将近三分之二，煤矿安全标准大幅提高。
8 But three-quarters of provincial output now comes from SOEs—with predictable results. Gone is the entrepreneurial vigour that the private sector once gave the industry, say locals involved in the business. State firms are reverting to type: keeping everyone they can on the payroll, squeezing wages, and hoping the provincial government will bail them out.
但山西省四分之三的煤炭产量由国有企业提供——而结果可想而知。当地人的参与使得煤炭业生机蓬勃，但在私营企业退出该产业后，煤炭业的商业活力不复存在。国有企业将一切恢复为原来的样子：留住在岗工人，压缩薪酬，同时希望省政府能够扶持他们。
9 It won’t. This is because Shanxi, as well as being the capital of coal, is the centre of President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Since 2013, seven of the 13 members of Shanxi’s Communist Party committee (the province’s leaders, basically) have been arrested or charged with “infractions of party discipline”, a term that usually means taking bribes. In all, 50 high-ranking officials have been placed under investigation for graft. For its size, the province has had more leaders arrested or jailed than anywhere else.
但这样的好事不会发生，因为煤矿中心的山西同样也是习近平主席反贪行动的中心。自2013年来，13位山西省共产党委员会会员（基本上都是山西省的领导班）中的7位已被拘留或者被冠以“扰乱党内纪律”的罪名，而这个罪名一般都是指收取贿赂。总体来看，已经有50位高官因为贪腐问题被调查。就人数来说，山西省被调查或监禁的领导比其他地方多。
10 Corruption, coal and politics have long been inextricably linked in Shanxi. In 2014 Caixin,
a magazine in Beijing, investigated Luliang county in the west of the province. It found that coal bosses there were spending $150,000 a year on bribes; one county-government jo
b had changed hands for $650,000.
贪污、煤炭以及政治在山西省一直以来都有着千丝万缕的关系。2014年，北京的一本杂志《财新》采访了山西省西部的陆良村。采访发现，当地煤矿主每年话15万美元用于贿赂官员，其中一个村政府的职务以65万元成交。
11 Though corruption was bad, the campaign against it is also taking a toll. Wang Rulin, Shanxi’s party chief, complains that he cannot fill about 300 local-government posts because people are too scared to apply—or they think that party jobs are not worth having now they have to be clean. One executive in the coal industry complains that officials “used to take money and help us; now they don’t take money and don’t help either.”
尽管贪污是坏事，反贪运动同样造成了一定的冲击。山西省委书记王儒林对此有所抱怨。有的人对贪污查处有所担忧，而有的人认为政府工作现在清廉的特性没有吸引力，这导致了当地政府有300个左右的职位空缺无法填满，一位工作在煤炭企业的管理人员称“政府以前收钱替我们办事，现在他们既不收钱也不办事”。
12 The hangover from cosy relations between coal and politics is visible in the form of
half-constructed residential blocks, which loom over the outskirts of even the smallest town. During the boom of the 2000s, coal bosses and local officials got together to pour money into house-building. Investment in property in Shanxi rose from 66 billion yuan in 2008 to 248 billion in 2013. The area under construction for residential use more than doubled to 179m square metres in the same period. Even by Chinese standards, this was extraordinary. The area under construction in Beijing expanded by only 40%. Such development can keep economic activity going for a while. But a housing boom on this scale is always risky. To judge by the empty space, Shanxi has built far too much.
到现在，煤炭业和政府间暧昧的关系依然能从半完工的住宅大楼中看到一丝蛛丝马迹，这些大楼耸立在一些城镇的外围，其中就包括那些小村落。在21世纪初蓬勃发展的阶段，煤矿老板和政府官员一起注资房地站。山西的地产投资从2008年的660亿上升到2013年的248亿。用于建设住宅用房的地区面积在同一时间段翻了一倍，上升到1790万平方米。即使是以中国的标准来看，这数字也是不同寻常的了。而在北京，用于建设的地区面积仅上升了40%。这样的发展让山西的经济增长持续了一段时间，但如此规模房地产市场的兴起总是内涵一定风险的。从闲置率能看出，山西建了太多不需要的房子。
13 The government’s hope that inland provinces will become new engines of growth rests on a belief that cheap labour and land are vital ingredients of it. But Shanxi shows that these advantages do not necessarily help as much as having a diversified, service-oriented economy. The problem is not that the province has failed to attract new businesses. It has two smartphone factories owned by Foxconn, a Taiwanese consumer-electronics company, which are its main source of foreign-currency earnings. But the losses of the coal sector offset gains made elsewhere.
政府希望内陆省份能够变成经济增长的新动力，因为其所有的低廉人工和土地是经济发展的重要因素。但山西的例子告诉我们这些优势对经济发展的作用没有一个多元化、服务导向的经济来的实际。问题不在于山西无法形成新的产业。台湾消费电子产品企业富士康在山西设立了两家智能手机组装工厂，成为山西省外汇收入的主要来源。但煤炭产业上的损失抵消了其他地方所获取的利润。
14 Shanxi is unusual among China’s provinces in being so dependent on coal. But some of its problems beset the whole country: corruption, unproductive investment and over-mighty SOEs. The country’s inadequate provision of pensions and unemployment benefits results in workers preferring to stay with SOEs which promise to look after them rather than strike out on their own. Leaders in Beijing sometimes make it sound as if the economy’s transition from manufacturing-led to services-led growth is going smoothly. In Shanxi the path is very bumpy. As at the Jinhuagong mine-cum-theme-park, it takes even longer to trudge back up to the surface than it does to walk down.
山西对于煤炭的依赖在中国的省级行政区是不常见的。但有的问题是其他地方都存在的，例如贪污、无生产作用的投资以及权力过大的国有企业。中国养老金和低保的不足使得人们更希望在福利较好的国有企业工作，而不是自己出来冒风险。中央政府的文件有时会让人觉得中国的经济增长从制造导向到服务导向的转变进行得很顺利。然而在山西，这条路总是磕磕绊绊。就像在晋华宫的煤炭主题园一样，从下层往上层走的时间肯定要从地表往煤矿里走的时间长。
Climate change 气候变化
Raise the green lanterns
1 WHEN world leaders gathered in Paris to discuss cutting planet-heating emissions, a pall of smog hung over Beijing. In parts of the capital levels of fine particulate matter reached 30 times the limit deemed safe. Though air pollution and climate change are different things, Chinese citydwellers think of them in the same, poisoned breath. The murky skies seemed irreconcilable
with the bright intentions promised in France.
当各国领导人齐聚巴黎讨论有关减少温室气体排放的问题，北京被厚厚的雾霾笼罩。在首都的某些地方，大气细颗粒物的含量达到了最低安全指标的30倍。尽管空气污染和气候变化不是一件事，但生活在城市的中国居民认为他们都会在我们呼吸的过程中毒害我们的健康。灰蒙蒙的天空似乎和领导人在法国所承诺的美好意愿不太相符。
2 Yet a marked change has taken place in China’s official thinking. Where once China viewed international climate talks as a conspiracy to constrain its economy, it now sees a global agreement as helpful to its own development.
然而中国官员的思维模式开始有了显著的变化。曾经中国认为国际气候谈判是一场阻碍其发展的鸿门宴，现在中国领导人将全球气候协议看成是有助其发展的一种推动。
3 China accounts for two-thirds of the world’s increase in the carbon dioxide emitted since 2000. It has come a long way in recognising the problem. When China first joined international climate talks, the environment was just a minor branch of foreign policy. The ministry for environmental protection had no policymaking powers until 2008. Only in 2012 did public pressure force cities to publish air-pollution data.
自2000年以来，全球三分之二二氧化碳排放量的增长量都来自中国。而中国在很长一段时间后才开始正视这个问题。当中国第一次参加国际气候谈判时，环境问题仅仅只是其外交政策的一个小分支。环境保护部在2008年以前都没有制定政策的权利。而出于公众舆论的压力，各市政府在2012年才公布了空气污染数据。
4 Yet today China pledges to cap carbon emissions by 2030 (reversing its former position that, as a developing power, it should not be bound to an absolute reduction); and it says it will cut its carbon intensity (that is, emissions per unit of GDP) by a fifth, as well as increase by the same amount the electricity generated from sources other than fossil fuels. The latest five-year plan, a blueprint for the Communist Party’s intentions that was unveiled last month, contains clear policy prescriptions for making economic development more environmentally friendly.
但是中国决定在2030年前控制碳排放（该决定与中国过往的立场完全不同，中国之前的立场是作为发展中国家的中国不应该被规定做出绝对数目的减排目标），宣布大幅减少碳浓度（即每单位GDP的排放量）达五分之一，同时中国将增加五分之一用除化石燃料以外的清洁能源来发电的电量。在上个月最新出炉的五年计划包含着共产党对中国未来的规划，其中明确包含促使经济更环保发展的政策。
There’s more 更多内容
5 Right after the Paris summit, however it ends, China is expected to make more promises in a new document, co-written by international experts, that presents a far-reaching programme of how China should clean up its act. It is based on models that account for both economic and political viability. On top of existing plans, such as launching a national emissions-trading scheme in 2017, the government may even outline proposals for a carbon tax, something that has eluded many prosperous countries in the West.
不管过程如何，各国在巴黎峰会上通过了一份由各国专家共同撰写的文件，其中要求中国在环境问题上给出更多的承诺，同时该文件中还有一个计划长远的项目用以指导中国该如何规范其行为。该文件是基于那些给出经济可行性和政治可行性的模型。在现存计划之外，如2017年开始运行的全国碳排放交易系统，中国政府甚至开始拟定征收碳排放税，而在许多发达的西方国家，这都是一件避而不谈的事。
6 The big question is why China is now so serious about climate change. The answer is not that Communist leaders are newly converted econuts. Rather, they want to use environmental concerns to rally domestic support for difficult reforms that would sustain growth in the coming decades.
Since a global slowdown in 2008 it has become clear that to continue growing, China must move its economy away from construction and energy-intensive industry towards services. At the same time, China faces an energy crunch. For instance, in recent years China has been a net importer of coal, which generates two-thirds of China’s electricity. It all argues for growth pla ns that involve less carbon.
问题是中国为什么现在对气候变化如此重视？答案不是因为共产党领导人向环境保护论低头。相反，中国领导人希望用环境问题来召集国内支持，增援改革瓶颈，维持接下来几十年的经济增长。自2008年全球经济增长放缓以来，中国领导人开始明白，要实现经济的持续增长，中国经济需要摆脱建筑业密集型和能源密集型的特点，转向服务集中型经济。与此同时，中国面临能源枯竭问题。举个例子，近几年中国是煤炭净进口国，而煤炭发电量占中国总发电量的三分之二。这些都让低碳经济增长计划成为讨论热点。
7 This is where signing international accords, such as the one hoped for in Paris, come in, for they will help the government fight entrenched interests at home. Observers see a parallel with China’s joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001. It allo wed leaders to push through internal economic reform against fierce domestic opposition. In the same way, a global climate treaty should help it take tough measures for restructuring the economy.
正如巴黎气候大会所预设达成的协议一样，签署这些国际协议能够让各国政府更有利地对抗国内根深蒂固的利益集团。有分析人士认为中国2001年加入世贸组织的行为也同样有着这一目的。此举让中国领导人能够在强烈的国内反对声音中继续推动内部经济改革。同样，全球性的气候条约能够使得一些重构经济的硬措施成为可能。
8 It will not be easy. Provincial party bosses and state-owned enterprises hate to shut factories, particularly in those parts of the country, such as Shanxi and Inner Mongolia in the north, where coal is a big employer. Cutting demand for energy is even harder. Even if the amount of electricity used by state industry falls, that used by private firms and households is bound to increase. What is more, environmental regulations and laws laid down by the centre are routinely flouted. 但是这不会是件简单的事。各省级政府以及各个国企领导不希望关闭工厂，特别是像山西和内蒙古这些以煤矿业提供工作岗位的北方省份。降低能源需求就更苦难了。即使国有产业的用电量下降了，民用和私营企业的用电量一定都会上升。另外，由中央政府制定有关环境的法律法规常常遭到各地政府的无视。
9 But cleaning up China’s act has, for the central gover nment, become a political necessity too. Environmental issues have been major public concerns for over a decade, says Anthony Saich of Harvard University, which has conducted polls. True, rural people fret most (and with good reason) about water pollution. But those in the cities gripe about their toxic air. Both represent a reproach to the government over its neglect of people’s lives and health.
但对于中央政府来说，变更中国的行为模式也开始有了政治必要性。哈佛大学的安东尼·塞挈进行了一项投票调查，称环境问题在过去十年中变成了公众关心的一大问题。事情确实是这样的，比如农村居民最担心的是水污染问题（这个担心也是非常合理的）。但那些居住在城市的人抱怨空气中的毒害成分。这两种人都表达了对政府忽略人民生命健康的斥责。
10 That is why national economic goals, political goals, public opinion and international pressure all point towards trying to cut emissions, pollutants included. In particular, says Zhang Zhongxiang of Tianj in University, now that dealing with climate change is a pillar of China’s diplomacy, the government must show it can keep its promises. It has some tools at its disposal. Across the country, the environmental record of government officials has become a crucial part of their evaluation by the Communist Party; and cadres will be held accountable for their actions even after leaving their position. Several provinces have already punished officials for environmental accidents and for not enforcing environmental laws.
这也是为什么国家的经济目标、政治期望、民众意见以及国际压力都将矛头指向了减少某些污染物在内的排放量。就像天津大学的张忠祥所说的一样，现在气候变化问题成为中国外交的重点之一，政府必须要拿出遵守承诺的行动。中国有着其自身可用的方法处理环境问题。环境行政档案成为了共产党评定一个政府官员的重要依据，各级政府官员即使在离职后依然要对其在职时所作的决策负责。某些省份已经因为出现有关环境问题的事故或者没有依环境法行政等问题对一些官员进行了惩处。
Fifty shades of grey 五十度灰
11 But there are obstacles to real change. The electricity grid and national power market are ill-equipped to increase renewable generation by much. Corruption in industrial procurement remains widespread, which does nothing to promote long-term efficiency or reductions in emissions. Competing incentives are also in play: earlier this year, the authorities forced a big Chinese investment company to buy back shares it had sold in old-fashioned industrial fields, for fear that it might depress share prices (which crashed anyway in a more general stockmarket meltdown). The government will not trust market mechanisms alone, says Yang Fuqiang of the Natural Resources Defense Council, an activist group.
但想要真正做到改变，前面还有一些拦路虎。国家电网和国家能源市场对于新能源大量涌入没有足够的准备。行业采购中的腐败行为依然泛滥，这对于提高长期效率以及减少排放没有好处。竞争激励依然起作用：今年早些时候，一家大型中国投资公司在旧工业领域出售了许多股份，但有关部门因为担心抛售会使股份价格贬值（虽然其股价在股市暴跌情况下依然跌至低谷），于是强制要求其购回相应股份。维权团体自然资源保护委员会的杨富强称，政府不会把宝都压在市场机制上的。
12 Nor are leaders yet pushing for change on all fronts. For instance, government efforts to cut emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide are greater than for many other greenhouse gases. Scarce and polluted water, one of China’s most severe environmental challenges, is almost entirely beyond the scope of the current raft of reforms. And China refuses to publish its estimate of the environmental toll of economic growth.
但政府也没有在每个方面都推进改革。例如政府对于减少二氧化碳和氮氧化物所采取行动明显大于其他温室气体。稀缺且日益受到污染的水资源是中国最严重的环境威胁之一，但却几乎没有没能在这一轮改革的方案之中看到相关措施。而且中国政府拒绝透露经济增长所带来的环境破坏预估值。
13 Sceptics scoff that China’s promises in Paris are irrele vant because emissions will probably peak regardless, long before the promised 2030. Nor has the government said how high that top might be. Yet the sceptics underestimate the importance of an international agreement for China and beyond. Like other countr ies, China has to date followed a pattern of “grow first, clean up later”. Yet very quickly it has recognised the dangers and drawbacks of such a policy and has been pouring money into clean energy and other innovations it hopes will provide green growth. In that, it may prove a model for other fast-developing countries. That might signal a small patch of blue sky.
持怀疑态度的人嘲弄称中国在巴黎气候大会上的承诺根本毫无意义，因为远在2030年前，全球温室气体排放量不论如何都会达到最大。尽管没有政府预计过这个最大的具体数值是多少，但这些人都低估了国际协议对于现在和以后的中国的重要性。和其他国家一样，中国曾经采用“先污染后治理”的模式。但是很快中国政府就意识到了其中的危害和缺点，并投入大量资金建设清洁能源和其他有助于绿色增长模式的研发。因此，中国或许能够成为其他高速发展国家的可模仿的例子。这可能标志着天空那一抹蔚蓝色出现。