土地开发型国有企业会计核算的思考

土地开发型国有企业会计核算的思考

近来，为加快地区发展，更好地引进企业项目，带动地方经济，各地纷纷成立土地开发型国有企业（以下简称土地开发企业）。该企业主要任务是以接受政府委托，代理开发在开发区内的大面积土地，同时进行相关基础配套设施建设，为土地挂牌出让及引进企业项目做好前期开发准备。

该企业具有以下特点：

（一）企业行业性质难以确定。土地出让主要以政府挂牌形式，企业不具有出让国有土地的资质，故企业不能划分为房地产开发行业。同样，企业资金主要来源于政府政策性扶持，而非企业本身服务收入，划为服务型行业也有所牵强。

（二）企业财务核算无参考标准。基于行业性质难以确定，故企业财务核算无法规范，同时国家也无明确文件规定，《企业财务通则》和《企业会计制度》亦未涉及相应具体内容。财务核算争议较大，有的企业按房地产会计进行财务核算，也有企业按服务业会计进行财务核算，财务核算缺少统一标准。

（三）企业政策性因素影响较大。企业受政府委托代理开发土地和进行基础配套设施建设，均严格按照政府规划和相关政策进行，企业的资金来源除一部分自身注册资金外，均来自政府政策性扶持。

因此，针对土地开发行业，建立规范的财务核算就显得尤为重要。笔者结合工作实践，探索了一套核算方法，以便与大家共同探讨。

一、土地开发企业开发建设核算

（一）企业开发建设需按区域规划，根据企业实际开发面积和财务核算需要，可人为划分核算区域。企业开发区域面积较大，可划分为若干个较小区域以方便核算；若开发区域事先未明确以后需逐年扩大增加面积的，也可事先确定部分区域面积，以后增加部分，则按实际面积成为新区域，以此类推，方便财务核算。

（二）企业投入建设主要通过“开发成本”科目核算。“开发成本”账户按企业区域划分二级明细，并根据企业实际投入需要设置以下明细：

1．“土地征用及拆迁补偿”：该细目主要核算企业土地开发前期的征用补偿、拆迁安置、植被补偿和耕地占用税等直接开发成本，并明确记载土地征用数量。

2．“基础配套设施建设”：该细目主要核算企业道路、河流、桥梁、绿化、污水处理以及通电、通水、通信“三通”等基础性公共配套设施建设。

3．“资本化利息”：该细目主要核算企业为土地开发向银行或者其他金融机构等借入资金而发生的符合资本化条件的利息费用。

4．“其他开发费”：该细目主要核算除上述细目外的其他相关的开发费用。

5．“转入开发产品”：该细目主要核算土地开发完工结转的开发成本，通常以红字记载，除冲减“开发成本”外，同时转出对应完工土地数量。

（三）土地征用及拆迁后，可采用自建或招标出包的方式进行项目施工和基础配套设施建设。

1．采用自行建造方式

企业自行进行项目施工和基础配套设施建设，按企业实际发生的物资成本、人工成本、交纳的相关税费等其他相关成本归集企业“开发成本”账户。相关会计分录如下：

借：开发成本——##园区（1）*——基础配套设施建设

贷：原材料

应付职工薪酬

应交税费等

注：*表示因##园区开发规模较大而在其内部人为划分若干个较小的开发区域，以方便财务核算。（1）为##园区内的1号子区域，以下相同。

2．采用招标出包方式

企业采用招标出包方式进行项目施工和基础配套设施建设，根据与中标施工企业合同中列明的工程款支付日期及工程进度支付款项。相关会计分录如下：

借：预付账款

贷：银行存款

待施工企业项目和基础配套设施建设完工后，转入“开发成本”账户。

借：开发成本——##园区（1）——基础配套设施建设

贷：预付账款

二、土地开发企业资金来源核算

土地开发企业资金主要来源于政府政策性扶持，该款项主要用于土地开发园区的开发建设，具有专款专用的性质，因此需要通过“专项应付款”科目进行财务核算。该科目应按对应开发区域设置二级明细。土地开发期间，资金的拨入，应增加“专项应付款”贷方账户；土地开发完成，完工结算后，冲减“专项应付款”贷方账户。

三、土地开发企业完工结算核算

土地开发完工，由政府收回挂牌出让前，相应结转土地开发成本。完工成品土地通过“开发产品”科目核算，并按开发区域设置二级明细，同时记载转入的成品土地数量。开发区域内结转的计划开发成本，可按企业预计区域总成本除以征用土地数量计算，公共基础配套设施投入，也按受益原则相应分配。完工成品土地按上述计算的计划成本和对应数量，由“开发成本”贷方账户转入“开发产品”借方账户。待政府收回后，转入的“开发产品”冲减对应“专项应付款”二级区域明细。具体分录如下：

借：开发产品——##园区（1）

贷：开发成本——##园区（1）——转入开发产品

待政府收回后：

借：专项应付款——##园区（1）

贷：开发产品——##园区（1）

如上例至整个##园区内所有开发土地全部完工结算，“开发成本”

的账户仍有余额，为企业实际结转成本与计划结转成本的差异数，应调整“开发产品”账户，并相应调整该区域内“专项应付款”账户余额。调整完毕，“专项应付款”账户仍有贷方余额，应确认收入，如为借方余额，确认当期损失。

四、资产负债表列示

（一）“开发成本”的列示：根据该账户的借方余额，列示于资产负债表“存货”账户，表明企业在开发进程中尚未完工土地的各项开发成本。

（二）“开发产品”的列示：根据该账户的借方余额，列示于资产负债表“存货”账户，表明企业已办理完工结算，政府尚未收回挂牌出让的成品土地。

（三）“专项应付款”的列示：根据该账户的贷方余额暂列于“专项应付款”账户，表明企业区域开发尚未完结时政府扶持资金拨入数，该科目待区域开发完结后仍有贷方余额，应确认收入；借方余额，确认当期损失。

以前只听人说过享有“天下第一村”美誉的华西村，前几天街道组织参观了华西村使我对华西村有了一个全新的认识。一是坚持解放思想、实事求是。吴仁宝带领华西村的干部群众把贯彻党的路线方针政策的坚定性与因地制宜发展的创造性高度统一，40多年来，他们解放思想，与时俱进，不唯书，不唯上，从本村实际出发，用科学的态度、独特的理念、创新的思路，引导华

西的改革和发展，表现出了共产党员敢为人先、敢于超越的创新勇气。华西村搞“一村两制”，村民既可以搞集体，也可以从事个体，但干部不得搞“一家两制”，更不允许搞“一人两制”。华西村走出了一条以集体经济为主，多种经济成分并存的多元化、混合型经济发展新路子。华西人坚持实事求是的坚定性令人叹服。

二是坚持制度创新。他们从华西实际出发，制定了一整套具有华西特色的管理制度和分配制度，创造性地提出了“企业合作制、厂长负责制、经理监管制、工代议事制”，对员工实行“首位高工资、末位淘汰制、违章辞退制”。在分配机制上，他坚持“少分配，多积累；少拿现金，多入股”。吴仁宝认为，农民办企业要发展，要壮大，只能靠自我积累，增强自身的造血功能。2001年6月以来，吴仁宝创造性地提出“一分五统”（即村企分开，经济统一管理、干部统一使用、劳动力统一安排、福利统一发放、村建统一规划）的发展建设大华西的新举措，这些创新理念和举措，吸引了大批有识之士，来这里创业，使华西村获得了源源不断的发展动力，华西经济如滚雪球一般越来越大。

三是坚持科学发展。华西村始终把率先发展、协调发展的科学发展观放在首位，构建和谐、文明、宜人的社会主义新农村。华西村从创业初期开始，一直把率先发展、科学发展、和谐发展贯穿始终，成为全国通过ISO14001国际环境质量管理体系认证的第一个村庄。华西村提出要倡导绿色文明，实施绿色发展战略，追求经济与环境的协调发展。先后投资数亿元，综合治理工业区环境，使工厂变成了花园。

大力发展循环经济和生态经济，目前，华西村已基本实现了“三废”资源化管理，对高炉、电炉、轧钢生产的煤气、工业废水等进行分类安置，实行综合利用。还投资近1000万元美化生活区，全村的绿化覆盖率超过40％，被评为“全国造林绿化先进村”。

四是坚持两手抓。“物质精神双富有，才是真正的富有”。吴仁宝始终坚持以人为本，一手抓经济发展，一手抓以德依法治村，让村民“既富口袋，又富脑袋”。目前，华西村里有书场、球场、溜冰场，有歌厅、舞厅、影剧院，各种文化娱乐设施配套齐全，村民的业余文化生活丰富多彩，全村上下始终保持勤于开拓、勇于创新、不甘守旧、奋发进取的精神状态。六是坚持德孝为先。华西村人重“孝”。早在20世纪80年代初，电热毯刚面世，吴仁宝和村干部就把它铺到了华西老人的床上：每年村里生产的瓜果蔬菜要让老人先尝鲜；看戏老人坐前排，看电影老人坐中间。从1979年起，华西村就逐步探索农村养老制度，目前凡年满55岁的妇女和60岁以上的男子，每月都能领到村里发的退休金。华西村还规定，家中如有老人活到100岁，奖励所有直系亲属每人一万元，真正实现了老有所养、老有所敬、老有所乐。华西的老人们都说，“儿好，女好，不如华西好”“凡到华西工作的，就是华西人”。他们非常关心外地来华西工作的人，不准称他们“打工仔”、“打工妹”。在政治上、经济上把外来职工与华西人同等对待。这也许是华西人气汪，事业兴的一个重要方面。

这些都值得我街道在建设社会主义新农村的实践中认真学习借鉴。更值得我个人在工作学习生活和做人上认真思考学习借鉴。

The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.

A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That’s just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it’s a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.

And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a

developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.

Now I know it’s a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It’s an assumption that modernity i s a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can’t. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like -- just as a beginning.

Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it’s sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not

from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I’m thinking here, for example, of customs like ance stral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. And there’s one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China’s big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often aren’t really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can’t run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It’s never been the case.

So this is China, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I’ll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is

unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire [Roman Empir e]. It divided, and it’s remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.

The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I’ll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. “Window dressing. When China gets it’s hands on Hong Kong, that won’t be the case.” 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation state mentality. But you can’t run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis of one civ ilization, one system. It doesn’t work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one

civilization, many systems.

Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.

Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it’s obviously got nothing to do with democracy, becau se in our terms the Chinese certainly don’t have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is

given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.

And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state’s power is continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It’s had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don’t see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It’s embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the

case in the West.

And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we’ve had to think about in the past. Know that China believes in the market and the state.

I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, “The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe.” And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous st ate. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it’s leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.

Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C. and was finally completed in the

seventh century A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there’s a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is China -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.

And yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts. If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong -- our predictions about what’s going to happen to Ch ina are incorrect -- this is the reason. Unfortunately I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It’s kind of arrogant. It’s arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefo re we have the universal measure. And secondly, it’s ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there’s a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And Paul Cohen argues that the

West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it’s not. In many ways, it’s the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it’s not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West, have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West’s presence in those societies. And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.

I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. -- a third of the world’s population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I’ll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I’m afraid, to the pre sent. Because what’s happening? Back to that chart at the beginning -- the Goldman Sachs chart. What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing wor ld. We’ve seen this in terms of the G20 --

usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table. When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.

And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it’ll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I’m afraid -- take Europe, America is slightly different -- but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Some people -- I’ve got an English friend in China, and he said, “The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion.” Well, maybe that’s true, maybe that’s an exaggeration. But there’s another problem which goes along with this -- that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. I mean, Europe once, of course, once co mmanded the future in it’s confidence. Take the 19th

century for example. But this, alas, is no longer true.

Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That’s what Europe an d North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India -- between them 38 percent of the world’s population -- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. And we will have to learn about these civilizations.

This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years

later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic. (Laughter) Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368.

I think they’re playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.

Welcome to the future. Thank you.