专业外文文献翻译

附录1：英文原文

The Renminbi’s Dollar Peg at The Crossroads In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency-basket peg. O ver the longer term, China’s large, modernizing, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility and, eventually, convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMB exchange rate would be a two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them. First, establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar, manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. Second, put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-oriented basis.

From 1997 until July 21, 2005, the Chinese authorities pegged the renminbi(RMB) price of the United States dollar within a narrow range. On July 21, 2005, China’s authorities moved to an adjustable basket peg against the dollar, with a revaluation of the central RMB/$ rate of 2.1 percent relative to the prior central rate of RMB 8.28 per dollar.

Very notably in view of the claims that China’s exchange rate policy is dict ated by the imperative of maintaining an undervalued currency, the authorities resisted substantial devaluation pressures, at the cost of some deflation, during the Asian crisis period starting in 1997. For some time now the situation has been reversed, with strong revaluation pressures, speculative capital inflows, and gathering inflationary

momentum in the economy. The ability to resist speculative pressures comes from the maintenance of restrictions on private capital flows, especially inflows, as well as from administrative controls useful in restraining inflation.

Nonetheless, “hot money” inflows have helped swell China’s foreign reserves immensely in recent years. Prior to July 21, 2005, most observers, and indeed the Chinese government itself, ackno wledged that China’s exchange-rate arrangements were unsustainable and undesirable as a long-term foundation for responding, without disruptive episodes of inflation or deflation, to inevitable real-side shocks, as well as to secular changes in the economy such as real appreciation due to Balassa-Samuelson effects. At the time of unification, the parallel rate already stood at a depreciated level relative to the official rate. Revaluation-cum-“flexation” is a response to the situation, including the external trade pressures it had generated, but leaves questions about how flexibility will be exploited in the future.

So far, even the ±0.3 percent margins of RMB/$ flexibility that exist have not been utilized fully. Furthermore, capital markets that are open to the world seem a prerequisite for a modern high-income economy such as China seeks eventually to become. The issues concern the transition. how might China best move toward a genuinely more flexible exchange-rate regime. And how might it best dismantle capital controls. And how might it optimally sequence these two conceptually distinct liberalization initiatives.

In the following pages I have four goals. First, to provide a brief overview of developments in China’s real exchange rate, external accou nts, and inflation, thereby filling in some concomitants of the nominal exchange rate trajectory in Figure. Second, to draw parallels with the experience of Germany (still the world’s premier exporter)during the Bretton Woods era. Third, to discuss the rather successful experiences of Chile and Israel in transiting from pegged exchange rates with capital controls to floating rates with financial opening. Fourth and finally, to sketch a blueprint for gradually flexing the RMB’s exchange rate in advance of ca pital-account liberalization. A feature of the basket system is that intervention in support of the basket rate could still be carried out entirely in the RMB/$ market. The reason is that

the basket can be implemented entirely through a variable RMB/$ exchange rate target. As a technical matter, the band could be redefined each morning using the exchange dollar rates prevailing earlier that day in the Tokyo markets. Or it could be updated more frequently. The decision to peg to a basket is also separable in principle from the decision on the denomination of foreign-currency reserves. Diversification of official reserves in line with the basket weights would serve to stabilize the value of reserves in terms of RMB, but is not otherwise a necessary adjunct of a basket peg system.

Once market forces are given greater play in determining the day-to-day value of the RMB/$ rate, the RMB might well move initially to the strong edge of any band that was established. For that reason, it is important that the existing capital flow controls not be dismantled until the exchange rate bands have been widened to the point where a managed float has been achieved. The move to a currency band, a band that could be widened over time, would render superfluous some of the ad hoc liberalization measures that have been deployed to ease exchange-rate pressures. Many discussions make insufficient distinction between enhanced exchange flexibility, which can be achieved (with less currency volatility) under restricted international financial flows, and openness of the financial account. The two are completely different, and a less risky sequencing would tackle the full gradual relaxation of financial-account controls only after the achievement of a good degree of exchange-rate flexibility. Eichengreen (2005) and Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang (2005) lay out the case for this sequencing in greater detail. The manifest hazards of opening to inflows in the current setting of domestic banking-system weakness furnishes one of the most compelling arguments for placing further decontrol of the financial account on the back burner. In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency peg.

Over the longer term, China’s large, modernizing, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility, and eventually, currency convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMB

exchange rate would be the following two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them:

Establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar. Manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. Possibly allow a trend crawl in the band to accommodate long-run real exchange rate changes due to structural changes along Balassa-Samuelson lines.

Put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB/basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-oriented basis. Only a resilient financial sector will be able to withstand the occasional sharp interest-rate changes that the monetary authorities may find necessary – whether they are responding to incipient unwanted exchange-rate movements or to domestic inflationary pressures.

附录2：中文译文

人民币汇率在十字路口

面对巨大的收支盈余和内部通货膨胀的压力，中国一直处在一个经典的其货币盯住一篮子货币的汇率机制下的内部和外部平衡之间的冲突。长远看来，中国的大型现代化和多元化的经济将需要汇率灵活性，并最终开放资本市场的可兑换。一个可行的和有吸引力的出口战略，从本质上固定人民币汇率将会是一个两阶段的方法，一致与2005年7月以来已经采取步骤，但超越他们。首先,为与人民币有关的一篮子主要贸易伙伴的货币建立一个有限的交易带。建立传送带，以便允许一些人民币对美元原始的估价，如果有必要，可以再这个地带管理一篮子货币汇率，随着国内外汇市场的发展，还可以拓宽这个地带。第二,暂缓特设金融市场自由化措施。他们将很难帮助缓解人民币汇率升值压力，一旦人民币汇对一篮子汇率可以允许在一个地带灵活移动，最好推迟直到国内外汇市场进一步发展，汇率完全灵活，国内的金融体制加强,并放在一个以市场为导向的基础之上。

从1997年到2005年7月21日，中国当局把用美元表示的人民币的价值限制在一个较窄的范围内。2005年7月21日，中国当局开始实行兑美元的可调节的一篮子货币的汇率, 相对于之前的中间价8.28元/美元，人民币对美元汇率升值2.1%。

在从1997年开始的亚洲金融危机期间，他们很明显针对宣称中国汇率政策被称作是维持一个被低估的货币,当局抵抗实质性的贬值压力, 以通货紧缩为代价。一段时间以来，形势已经逆转, 人民币具有较强的升值压力, 投机资本流入, 并在经济中聚集了通货膨胀的势头。能够抵御来自维护限制私人资本流动的投机压力, 以及从行政管制有效地抑制通货膨胀，尤其是资本的流入。

尽管如此, 在最近的几年里，“热钱”的流入加剧了中国外汇储备的极大的膨胀。在2005年7月21日之前, 大多数观察家，事实上，中国政府本身，承认中国的汇率安排作为长期的基础是不能成立的，不和需要的，没有破坏性的发作的通货膨胀或通货紧缩, 必然是真正几个方面的冲击，以及对经济的长期变化，比如说由于巴拉萨萨缪尔森效应引起的长期的增值。在联合的时候, 平行汇率已达到一个相对于贬值官方利率水平。附带增长的货币增长是一种情境化的反应，包括对外贸易已经产生的压力，但是遗留下来关于如何开发未来的灵活性的问

题。

到目前为止，甚至人民币对美元的汇率弹性±0.3%的利润还没有被充分利用。此外，资本市场对世界开放似乎是一种现代高收入经济的前提，比如中国寻求最终的实现。这个问题涉及到中国如何更好地向真正的更好的更灵活的汇率机制转变，它将如何最好的废除资本控制，它将如何最佳优化那两个概念性的明显的自由化的主动权序列。

在接下来的文章中我有四个目标。首先，提供一个简要概述，关于中国实际汇率的发展、外部账户和通货膨胀, 从而填充一些与名义汇率共存的轨迹图。第二, 画出德国的经验(仍然是世界首要的出口商)在布雷顿森林体系时代的经验。第三, 讨论了智利和以色列人从固定汇率和资本管制到浮动利率金融开放成功

的经验。第四, 最后勾画出逐渐弯曲的人民币汇率转移到了资本帐户自由化之前的蓝图。一篮子货币汇率制度的一个特征是介入以支一篮子货币汇率能够继续执行人民币/美元完全市场。究其原因是，一篮子货币能够完全地实现，通过一个可变的人民币/美元汇率目标。作为一个技术问题, 这个地带能被重定义每天早上使用的在东京市场上的前一天的兑换美元的汇率。或者，这也可能被更频繁地更新。紧盯住一篮子货币的决定也是可以分离的原则上也可从外汇储备的等级决定。官方储备的多样化与一篮子货币的重要性相一致能够服务于人民币储备价值的稳定，而不是盯住一篮子货币体系的必要的辅助。

一旦市场力量决定了参加日常的更大价值人民币/美元汇率, 人民币或许能够首先更好地移动到任何确定的边缘地带。因此，重要的是要从现有资本流量控制被取消,直到达到有管理的浮动被拓宽了汇率边缘的地步。向货币边缘的移动，一个随着时间的推移能够被拓宽的边缘，也许会导致一些多余的特设的部署缓解汇率的压力的自由化措施。许多讨论使区分外汇灵活性增强不足, 就可以实现(用较少的汇率波动)在限制国际金融流动和开放性金融帐户。这两者是完全不同的, 一个风险较小的次序将解决逐渐放松金融账户充分的控制只能在实现一个较高的汇率的灵活性的很高的自由度之后。格林(2005年)和普拉萨德，鲁姆博夫，王建民(2005)展示出更详细的细节的问题。在现在的环境下，明显的障碍开放流动表现在危害流入国内当前设置国立银行弱点提供的一个最令人信服的论据下单进一步的取消金融账户暂时搁置。面对巨大的收支盈余和内部通胀压力, 中国

一直在一个经典的内部和外部平衡之间的冲突在它的美元货币盯住美元的汇率机制。

长远看来, 中国的大型现代化和多元的经济需要汇率灵活性, 最终, 货币兑换开放资本市场。一个可行的和有吸引力的退出策略从本质上是固定的人民币汇率将下列两阶段方法, 符合2005年7月以来的步骤已经采取，但可能超越他们。

建立一个与人民币相关的一篮子货币相关的主要交易合作伙伴的货币的有限交易带。设置一个边缘带以便它允许人民币对美元汇率的货币升值。在可能的情况下于边缘地带管理一篮子货币汇率, 如果有必要，可以随时间流逝拓宽边缘带, 依照国内外汇市场发展。可能使得趋势中变动，由于调整长期的实际的汇率变动所致沿着萨谬尔森线结构变化。

搁置的临时措施金融账户自由化。他们将会减少帮助缓解压力一旦人民币对一篮子货币汇率是允许在一个边缘带灵活移动，他们最好推迟到国内外外汇市场进一步发展，汇率是完全灵活，国内金融系统已经增强，放置在一个以市场为导向依据。只有有弹性的金融部门能够承受偶尔锋利利率调整，货币当局是否会发现有必要的——他们因应汇率变化或不必要的初期国内通货膨胀的压力。