考研英语时文阅读(34)
考研时文阅读（34）金融危机究竟会对美国的经济潜力造成多大损害？(2011-04-25 09:04:47)转载标签： 黄涛考研时文阅读教育 分类： 阅读篇
How much will the financial crisis hurt America’s economic potential?
金融危机究竟会对美国的经济潜力造成多大损害？
AMID the hubbub over a few less-bad-than-expected statistics, America’s economic debate has turned to the nature of the recovery. Optimists expect a vigorous rebound as confidence returns, pent-up demand is unleashed and massive government stimulus takes effect. Most observers, including this newspaper, are bracing for a long slog, as debt-laden consumers rebuild their savings, output growth remains weak and unemployment continues to rise. There is, however, something that eventually will have a much bigger impact on Americans’ prosperity than the slope of the recovery. That is the effect of the crisis on America’s potential rate of growth itself.
在对一些比预期稍好的数据的聒噪中，对美国经济的争论倒向了恢复的一边。乐观人士预计在信心回稳、抑制的需求得到释放以及政府大规模刺激方案取得成效的情况下，经济会有力的反弹。包括本报在内的多数观察家则认为慢慢前路仍充满艰险，因为深陷债务泥潭的消费者在重新建立他们的储蓄，出口增长依然疲软而且未就业人数继续上升。然而，一些东西最终对美国繁荣的影响要比经济复苏这一斜线大的多。那就是危机对美国潜在增长率的影响。
An economy’s long-term speed limit (its “trend” or “potential” rate of growth) is the pace at which GDP can expand without affecting unemployment and, hence, inflation. It is determined by growth in the supply of labor (the number of workers and how long they toil) along with the speed with which productivity improves. The pace of potential growth helps determine the sustainability of everything from public debt to the prices of shares.
一个经济体的长期速度限制（它的“趋势”或“潜在”增长率）是它维持GDP能够增长而又不影起未就业人数和通货膨胀变化的速度。它由劳动力供给（工人数量和工作时间）的增长与生产率提高的速度决定。潜在增长率的速度帮助决定了从公共债务到股票价格等的一切事物的可持续性。
Unfortunately, the outlook for America’s potential growth rate was darkening long before the financial crisis hit. The IT-induced productivity revolution, which sent potential output soaring at the end of the 1990s, has waned. More important, America’s labor supply is growing more slowly as the population ages, the share of women working has leveled off and that of students who work has fallen. Since 1991 the labor supply has risen at an average annual pace of 1.1%. Over the next decade the Congressional Budget Office ex
pects a 0.6% annual increase.
不幸的是，早在金融危机袭来之前，美国的潜在增长率的前景就日趋暗淡。曾在90年代末使潜在前景飞涨的IT导向型生产力革命已经式微，更重要的是，美国的劳动力供给速度要远落后于人口老龄化的速度。参加工作的妇女所占的份额与之前持平，而学生的就业率在下降。自1991年起劳动力供给以年均1.1％的速度增长。国会预算办公室预测未来10年的增长速度为0.6％。
According to Robert Gordon, a productivity guru at Northwestern University, America’s trend rate of growth in 2008 was only 2.5%, the lowest rate in its history, and well below the 3-3.5% that many took for granted a few years ago. Without factoring in the financial crisis, Mr. Gordon expects potential growth to fall to 2.35% over the coming years.
据西北大学生产力专家Robert Gordon,称，美国2008年的增长率仅仅接近2.5％，这是历史上的最低点，而且远低于多数人前些年认为理应达到的3－3.5％。将金融危机排除后，Gordon先生预计未来几年的潜在增长率回跌落到2.35％。
That alone is grim news. But has the Great Recession made things worse? In theory, it could do. Slumping investment may slow the pace of innovation. Soaring government debt could raise interest rates. Higher taxes, designed to reduce the debt, might dull incentives to work and invest. More regulation, in finance and beyond, could deter innovation. Workers’ skills may atrophy as a result of joblessness. On the plus side, well-targeted government spending on, say, infrastructure or education could boost potential output, while the huge wealth that Americans have lost may induce more of them to work for longer.
单独来看这是一个残酷的消息，然而是经济大萧条把事情弄得更糟吗？理论上讲，是的。暴跌的投资会减缓创新的速度。飚升的国债导致利率升高。旨在减少债务的更高额税金或许会降低工作和投资的动机。在金融与其它领域的更多监管会阻碍创新。作为失业的恶果，工人们的技能可能会退化。从正面上看，政府对基础设施和教育有的放矢的投资能够提升潜在产出，尽管美国人失去的巨额财富可能促使更多的人工作更长时间。
History sends mixed signals about how much these effects matter. Surprisingly, the 1930s bode well. Despite the deep slump in growth and investment, America’s potential growth rate is reckoned to have risen smartly during the decade, as innovations from nylon to synthetic rubber proliferated, while business processes were fundamentally overhauled. Alexander Field, an economist at Santa Clara University, has called the 1930s the “most technologically progressive” decade of the 20th century.
对于这些对此问题的影响有多大，历史给出了混杂的答案。令人吃惊的是，30年代预示了良
好的形势。尽管增长与投资暴跌，但由于诸如尼龙和人造橡胶等创新的普及，美国的潜在增长率经计算在这10年中还有小幅上升。在此期间商业过程得到根本性的革新。Santa Clara大学的经济学家Alexander Field将30年代称之为20世纪“最技术革新”的十年。
In the modern era Sweden offers grounds for optimism. Its productivity growth accelerated after the early 1990s financial crash, in part because the government dealt swiftly with the banking mess. Japan, in contrast, saw productivity growth shrivel in the early 1990s. Several studies pin blame for that on Japan’s unwillingness to tackle its banking mess. But the process was not irreversible; Adam Posen of the Peterson Institute has argued that by the late 1990s Japan’s potential output had risen modestly, thanks to financial reform and broader deregulation. Nor is there much sign that Japan’s gaping budget deficits have crowded out private investment. Yields on long-term Japanese bonds slumped from 7% in 1990 to 1% in 2003, and are still only 1.45%, even as gross public debt is heading for 200% of GDP.
在现代，瑞典为乐观者提供了坚实土壤。它的生产力增长在90年代早期金融冲击后加速，这部分得益于政府对银行坏帐的及时处置。日本则与其恰恰相反，在90 年代早期它的生产力增长减缓。许多研究将批评矛头指向日本无意解决它的银行坏帐问题。但这个过程不是不可逆的。Peterson研究所的 Adam Posen 认为由于金融改革和更大规模的解除管制，日本的潜在产量在90年代后期有了适当上升。也没有什么迹象表明日本那令人吃惊的预算赤字对私人投资产生了挤出效应。日本长期债券收益从1990年的7％跌落至2003年的1％。即使公共负债的总额达到GDP的两倍，收益也只有1.45％。
Is this cause for optimism about America? Possibly not. Compared with the 1930s, America’s workers are more specialized, which makes it harder to shift occupation; they are also more cushioned with social protection, which reduces the urgency to adapt. Workers are less flexible because the housing bust will prevent many from selling their houses to move to where the jobs are. JP Morgan estimates that America’s natural rate of joblessness may have risen from 4.75% to closer to 6%.
这是对美国持乐观精神的原因吗？可能不是。与30年代相比，美国工人们变得更加专业，这使得他们更难更换工作；社会保护措施给了他们更多的缓冲，这就降低了他们适应当前形势的迫切性。工人们并没有多少灵活性，因为房地产的破产将阻碍许多人卖掉房屋从而搬迁到能够找到工作的地方。JP Morgan 预计美国的自然失业率可能从4.75％上升至接近6％。
Today’s investment slump may have particularly pernicious effects on productivity because, unlike Japan’s, it
does not follow a capital-spending binge. During the recent bubble years, America’s housing investment boomed, but corporate investment was laid low by the dotcom bust.
现今暴跌的投资可能对生产力有显著的恶劣影响，因为随它而来的并不是资本消费的盛宴，这与日本不同。在最近充满泡沫的几年里，美国的房地产投资很繁荣，但公司投资由于之前的互联网崩溃而处于低位。
Debt burden
债务负担
Most important, even if Americans become thriftier, soaring public debt may crowd out private investment more than in Japan, which, unlike America, is a creditor country. Already American bond yields are starting to rise. Academics differ about just how much bigger budget deficits and higher public debt affect interest rates, but most agree that they do. A 2004 study suggests that interest rates rise by 0.03% for every 1% increase in the debt/GDP ratio. That ratio is set to rise by 30 percentage points between 2008 and 2011, which implies a 1% higher risk-free interest rate, and commensurately lower private-sector investment. Even if higher private saving blunts the effect, some crowding out is eventually all too likely.
最关键的是，即使美国人变得节俭了，飞涨的公共债务可能会对私人投资产生挤出效应，而且要比日本的更厉害。而日本是一个债权人国家，这与美国不同。美国债券收益已经开始上升。学者们只就多大的预算赤字和多高的公共负债会影响利率意见不同，但多数人认为它们的确会影响利率。一份2004年的研究显示负债与 GDP之比每提高1％，利率就升高0.03％。在2008到2011间，这个比值将固定为上升30个百分点，这就意味着无风险利率每升高1％，私人部门投资就会降低相应的数额。即使更多的个人储蓄会弱化这一效应，某些挤出效应将最终与其类似。
All of these effects can be mitigated by good policies, or exacerbated by bad ones. Sensible approaches to reducing America’s long-term deficit, by tackling entitlement spending or reforming the tax code, would minimize the rise in long-term yields and might even boost potential growth. Misguided efforts to prop up declining industries or dictate lending decisions would add to the damage. America is heading for an era of slower growth. Just how much slower is still up for grabs.
所有的这些影响可以通过实施好的政策得以减轻，也可以在不力政策下进一步恶化。通过解决授权支出或改革税法的办法是削减美国长期赤字的明智方法，这将使长期收益的增长最小化并且甚至可能提高潜在增长。支持衰微产业或指定贷款决议的误入歧途的努力会增加损害。美国正在走向慢速增长的时代。只是到底有多慢，这还有待观察。
考研时文阅读（34）网络搜索
数据也许可以帮助经济预测专家(2011-05-01 21:38:05)转载标签： 黄涛时文阅读考研杂谈 分类： 阅读篇
Internet search data may be useful for forecasters
网络搜索数据也许可以帮助经济预测专家
CLAIMS of clairvoyance, particularly when they come from economists, deserve a sceptical reception. Hal Varian, a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley who also happens to be Google’s chief economist, has no such pretensions, but he does believe that data on internet searches can help predict certain kinds of economic statistics before they become available.
人们具有预见能力的这一说，尤其是经济学家的预见能力通常都会引起质疑。加州大学伯克利分校的经济学教授，谷歌公司首席经济学家Hal Varian表示，他没有如此的洞察力和预见力，但他相信在某些经济统计数据公布之前，网络搜索的数据能够帮助预测这些数据。
In a new paper written with Hyunyoung Choi, a colleague at Google, he argues that fluctuations in the frequency with which people search for certain words or phrases online can improve the accuracy of the econometric models used to predict, for example, retail-sales figures or house sales. Actual numbers for such things are usually available only with a lag. But Google’s search data are updated every day, so they can in theory capture shifts in consumer behaviour before official numbers are released.
Varian和谷歌的另一名同事Hyunyoung Choi最新发表了一篇论文，他表示对于人们在网上搜索的一些字词短语，其频率的变化可以提高经济计量模型预测零售销售或售房数据的准确性。这些确切销售数据通常是要滞后一段时间才能得到。但是谷歌搜索数据每天都在更新，因此理论上在官方数字出炉之前，们就把握住了消费者行为的变化。
These data are available through a site called Google Trends, which allows anyone who cares to do so to download an index of the aggregate volume of searches for particular terms or categories. Mr Varian and Mr Choi show that the addition of these search trends to econometric models improves the accuracy of their estimates.
人们可以在一个名叫谷歌趋势的网站上得到这些数据，并且可以下载特定条款或物品被搜索总量的指数。Varian和Choi表示，共同利用这些搜索趋势和经济计量模型就能够提高预测的准确性。
For example, using data on searches for trucks and SUVs to predict the monthly sales of motor vehicles reduces the average error by up to 18% compared with the predictions from a model that did not incorporate the search data. The volume of searches for Hong Kong carried out in countries like America, Britain, Australia and India also seems to predict eventual tourist arrivals to the territory from these countries rather well.
比如，与不用搜索数据的模型得出的预测相比，利用货车和SUV的搜索数据来预测汽车月销售量会减少高达18%的平均误差。在美国，英国，澳大利亚和印度等国进行的对香港的搜索似乎也能预测从这些国家到香港旅行的游客人数。
How widely could this idea be applied? For some things, like retail sales, the categories into which Google classifies its search-trend data correspond closely to what people may want to predict, such as the sales of a particular brand of car (see chart). For others, like sales of houses, things are less clear. It appears that searches for estate agents work better than those for home financing. But anything that makes the crystal ball less cloudy is welcome.
这一方法的应用有多广？对于一些事物，比如零售销售，某些种类（谷歌将搜索趋势数据划分到该种类）和人们期望预测的事物非常相关，比如某一种汽车品牌的销售。对于其它的项目，如房屋销售，情况就比较模糊。但对房地产经纪人的搜索似乎比对房屋抵押贷款机构的搜索更能清楚地说明房屋销售问题。无论如何，，只要能使这个水晶球更加透明清晰，任何方法都是受人欢迎的。