英语时文阅读2

第23小组：

李壮壮（）陈舒然（）王晨（）王一婷（）毛志浩（）陈乃摇（）杨小倩（）杨光蕤（）

推荐理由：11月21日18时30分，中国人民银行官方公布：自11月22日起下调金融机构人民币贷款和存款基准利率，即五年期以上房贷基准利率由原先的6.55%降为6.15%，相当于九四折利率优惠。这将助推房企翘尾跑量，提升房地产价格。央行降此次降息是央行自2012年7月时隔28个月后首次调整基准存贷率，并且是首次不对等的分别下调0.4个百分点的贷款基准利率和0.25个百分点的存款基准利率。降息对于房地产市场是最直接的刺激影响，一方面其相当于购房者在贷款的额度上利息上打了九四折，另一方面对于购房的心理也是一个提振。然而房地产价格在中国的许多地区已经处于较高的水平了，且债务占GDP 的比重也已经到达250%,中国是否会会重蹈日本“失落的十年”房地产价格急剧下降50%的覆辙,。这是我们应该关注的问题。

The People’s Bank of China Covert operations

Nov 22nd 2014

From FT

China’s central bank is wary（谨慎的、警惕的）of easing monetary policy, but that is what the economy needs

IN BEIJING, a city of grandiose government offices, the central bank stands out for its modesty. Its headquarters（总部）are small and dated; plans for a big, gleaming extension have so far come to nothing. Cramped as they are, however, these digs are an apt symbol of the central bank’s restraint.

For nearly four years the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) [1] has classified monetary policy as “prudent” [2], which is supposedly a neutral stance—not too tight, not too loose. In reality it has been tightening, to cool an overheated property market and slow the alarming accretion of debt[3]. At the same time,the central bank has chipped away at vestiges of central planning with changes to its currency and interest-rate regimes. The PBOC is far from independent, but under Zhou Xiaochuan, its governor since 2002, it has acquired real clout（影响力）as it has doggedly pursued its dual objectives of restraint and reform[4].

These two aims were complementary in 2011, when the central bank first embraced prudence. Nominal growth（名义增长）was still running at 18%, a heady pace even by Chinese standards; slowing breakneck investment was essential. Yet times have changed. The economy is now on track for its weakest year since 1990, sliding below the government’s goal of 7.5% growth; inflation is at a five-year low, nearly two percentage points below the official 3.5% target. The central bank faces mounting calls to lower rates. But advisers say it fears sending the wrong message: by easing, it might signal an end to restraint and, by extension, to reform.（量化宽松的实行，可能标志着治理的结束；如果再引伸一下，就是金融改革的结束。）

The central bank’s answer to this dilemma has been to loosen monetary policy, but in a covert fashion. It lent the state-owned China Development Bank one trillion yuan ($163 billion), according to rumours（谣言）that dribbled into local media in June. Some likened it to Chinese-style quantitative easing (QE)[5]: the central bank had in effect printed cash to rev up（加速；（使）活跃起来）growth. But whereas central banks in developed economies have explained every step of their QE schemes to markets, the PBOC did not even bother to announce its activity.

Then, in September and October, it launched a “medium-term lending facility [6]”, injecting a further whack（重击）of cash—769.5 billion yuan, it turns out—into the economy via loans to commercial banks. Rumours spread for weeks before the central bank confirmed them on November 6th. As for the initial trillion-yuan loan, it eventually acknowledged the operation, though declined to say how much it had lent, at what rate or even to which bank.

The combined amount of the infusions（灌输，注入物，激励）, if as big as reported, would be huge—equal to more than three months of America’s now-completed QE scheme when it was at its height, or to five months of Japan’s current programme. The impact of China’s easing, however, has been underwhelming（未留下深刻印象）. It has not reached the real economy. Short-term interest rates have fallen: a closely watched interbank rate[7] is down by almost two percentage points this year, to 3.2% (see chart). But the rate at which banks lend to businesses, which matters more for growth, has remained stuck at about 7%.

The central bank’s lack of transparency has sown confusion. “The more policy tools you have, the harder it is to predict changes in any one of them,” says Song Yu of Goldman Sachs. A recent Barclays survey[8] ranked the PBOC third-worst of 14 big central banks in terms of communication, behind only Turkey’s and Russia’s.

Even when providing partial confirmation of its covert easing[9], the PBOC’s message was muddled. The purpose was “to guide banks to lower lending rates”, it said, an apparent indication of an intention to relax policy. But in the next breath it added that the easing was to compensate（补偿，弥补）for a decline in capital inflows （资金流入）, in order to “maintain a neutral, appropriate level of liquidity”—that is, to keep policy unchanged.

The central bank is right to be concerned about debt. Economy-wide debts have soared to 250% of GDP, up by 100 percentage points since 2008. Increases of that magnitude（巨大，广大，重大）have presaged（预示，预兆）financial crises in other countries, so tighter policy would seem in order. Yet real interest rates have climbed to more than 8% for industrial companies, since the prices at which they sell their wares are actually declining. That, in turn, makes debts much harder to service than anticipated. Cutting interest rates while enforcing capital rules to prevent banks from issuing a gusher（喷油井）of new loans would be a better way to rein（驾驭，控制）in debt.（（货物价格的下降），反过来，使得债务比预期的更加难偿还。在降低利息的同时加强资本规则的执行来防止银行新债务发行过度是一种对这些债务更好的控制方法。）The PBOC has talked instead of “fine tuning [10]” monetary policy and making it more “targeted”. The loan to China Development Bank appears to have been earmarked（标记）for public housing[11], which local governments have struggled to fund. To borrow from the “medium-term facility” banks were said to be obliged to （不得不）reduce mortgage rates [12]. In other words, having let air out of the property market, the PBOC now seems to be pumping it up again. “The problem is that there’s no clear framework for monetary policy. They are feeling their way through,” says Zhang Bin of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences（中国社会科学院）. “If you change targets, you should explain why.”

In the background are questions about the future of the long-serving Mr Zhou. He was due to step down（退位）in 2013, having reached the official retirement age of 65. When his term was extended, it was seen as an endorsement（认可，支持）of his reformist agenda. But a few months ago, word spread in Beijing that he might soon be replaced. Some even suggested that he had pushed too hard to deregulate interest rates[P2]（放松利率管制）.

People familiar with the PBOC say that talk of Mr Zhou’s imminent retirement has since died down. Yet he will eventually depart. His legacy will be extremely positive overall: he has presided（统辖，指挥；负责）over an era of rapid growth, stable inflation and progress in financial reforms. [P3]But his final years in office are turning into a bit of a muddle.（混乱）

NOTE:

[1]：PBOC

PBOC: The People's Bank of China 中国人民银行

PBOC是中国人民银行的英文名称的缩写，也就是我们平时所说的央行。但是一般使用PBC 这个缩写。

[2]：monetary policy as “prudent”（稳健的货币政策）

稳健的货币政策，是指根据经济变化的征兆来调整政策取向，当经济出现衰退迹象时，货币政策偏向扩张；当经济出现过热时，货币政策偏向紧缩。最终反映到物价上，就是保持物价的基本稳定。

在我国货币政策管理中，中央银行是以比较平稳的货币供应量增长来实现稳健的货币政策操作的。从一般货币理论看，对货币供应量的增长有两种不同的操控手段：恒定与权变。前者认为，只要货币供应量保持固定增长率，公众就会作出合理预期，从而使物价收敛于稳定。后者认为，货币供应量应随经济的变动，由央行随时调节。前者的缺点是过于僵硬，在现实中几乎无法运行；后者则因政策制定者预测的主观性与公众对未来预期的不确定性的冲突而受到挑战。因此，不少国家采用预先公布货币供应量增长区间的方式进行调控。在我国，也有人认为控制货币供应量不是好的货币控制手段，应以利率作为调控的中间目标。其实，我国的利率还处于管制阶段，企业还处于对利率不敏感时期。在这种条件下，央行放弃对货币供应量的调控，转而用调整利率的方式来影响经济，实际上是不可能的。

从总体上看，近几年稳健的货币政策取得了明显效果。2003年GDP增长9．1％，广义货币供应量（M2 ）增长19．6％，居民消费价格指数（CPI）上涨1．2％；2004年GDP增长9．5％，M2 增长14．6％，CPI上涨3．9％。今年M2 计划增长15％，CPI估计上升 3．28％。

[3]：accretion of debt（债务堆积）

债务堆积的本质是收入的衰退

资产说到底是收入的贴现，收入不行，资产也倒了。从这个意义上讲，债务问题背后的实质是经济增长问题，债务快速堆积的实质是收入增长的衰退，简单讲，就是经济增速(名义)开始显著落后于债务增速，意味着新增收入很难用于偿付旧债的本息。

债务过高反转过来会紧缩需求，从而造成进一步减速。意味着这是一个负反馈加强的过程，这一过程一般会存在某一变快的临界点，如哈佛大学的卡门.莱因哈特和肯尼思.罗戈夫两位教授对债务和增长的关系进行了研究。他们的研究显示：90%是(企业或政府)债务与国内生产总值(GDP)之比的一个临界值，若高于90%，经济增长的骤降可能性显著上升。

Cecchetti等人(2011年)的研究也表明，适度水平的债务能提升福利、促进增长，但高的债务水平具有破坏性；他们用18个OECD国家1980年到2010年的资金流量表数据进行估计，研究结论表明，政府部门的债务阈值是85%(债务/GDP)，企业部门的债务阈值则是90%(债务/GDP)。一旦超过阈值，随后发生经济困难或危机的可能性会大幅上升。

债务堆积在货币层面的反映是货币周转速度不断变慢，货币量虽然快速上升，但实体经济的融资成本依然高企(政府扩张挤出效应)，经济增长越来越依赖于新增货币的推动。由于货币沉淀，每年虽然社会净融资规模巨大，但形成增量部分的比例越来越低，很多信用的投放是维持存量债务的存续(借新偿旧)。比方说每年新增的企业存款占社会净融资的比例从

2002年以来显著下降，在2008年以前平均在58%以上，而2012年已经滑落至28%，尽管2012年社会净融资高达16万亿元，占GDP的比例超过30%。

[4]：dual objectives of restraint and reform（抑制与改革的双重目标：抑制通

胀和经济改革）

中国央行不是独立机构，但是自2002年周小川担任行长以来，央行获得了真正的影响力，坚定的追求着抑制与改革的双重目标。在过去四年里，中国人民银行(PBOC)对货币政策比较“谨慎”，据推测是不太松也不太紧的中立态度。事实上，中国央行一直在采取紧缩政策，为过热的房地产市场降温，为令人担忧的债务增长减速。与此同时，央行削弱了中央关于改革货币和利率制度的计划。

如今中国经济迎来了1990年以来走势最弱的一年，经济增长低于政府的预定目标7.5%；通胀率达到五年来最低水平，比预定目标3.5%低了两个百分点。中国央行面临降低利率的

呼声持续高涨。但经济顾问们担心这会发出错误信号：如果采取宽松政策，可能标志着抑制政策，甚至经济改革的终结。

中国央行正处于艰难境地。中国央行正在努力遏制影子银行系统猛增的债务，算是中

国管理机构中最为勇敢的。中国央行担心降低利率会被视为政策上的彻底转变，标志着央行在管控借贷过度政策上发生倒退。因此，中国央行倾向于采取隐秘的宽松政策。

[5]：中国式QE

中国式的QE是近期提出的一个新概念。目前还未得到官方的承认，同时各界对中国式QE 的观点不一。央行一方面实行“定向降准”，另一方面实行“定向降息”，这种做法实际体现为结构性的货币宽松。是一种隐蔽的宽松货币政策。

QE是指中央银行在实行零利率或近似零利率政策后，通过购买国债等中长期债券，增

加基础货币供给，向市场注入大量流动性资金的干预方式，以鼓励开支和借贷，也被简化地形容为间接增印钞票。量化指的是扩大一定数量的货币发行，宽松即减少银行的资金压力。

2008年11月9日，国务院推出4万亿经济刺激计划，就是一次宽松的货币政策。今年上

半年，央行实施两次定向降准，并向国开行提供1万亿元PSL(Pledged Supplementary Lending 抵押补充贷款），PSL作为一种新的储备政策工具，有两层含义，首先量的层面，是基础货币投放的新渠道；其次价的层面，通过商业银行抵押资产从央行获得融资的利率，引导中期利率。低息贷款。7月以来，央行又向多家地方银行提供了额度5亿到10亿不等的低息再贷款。中国的量化宽松是穿着定向宽松的外衣出现的，定向被贴上了“结构调整”的标签。

再贷款是指中央银行为实现货币政策目标而对金融机构发放的贷款。中国的再贷款有两种含义，狭义的再贷款是指中央银行对金融机构贷款的总称；广义的再贷款是指再融资的概念，包含票据再贴现。但再贴现作为货币政策工具传统的三大法宝之一，应排除在再贷款的

范畴外。

中国式QE降低长期债权利率。也是一种宽松货币政策的体现。再贷款有一个好处是可以不向市场公布，并且有专款专用的针对性，符合货币政策预调微调的思路。央行的再贷款相当于变相减少了3000亿元长期债券供给，与美国的QE购买长期国债的效果是类似的，这是导致4月以来长债利率大幅下降的主要原因之一。

中国版QE的说法不准确，目前我国非常规货币政策与西方QE在背景、经济状况、货币工具是否用尽等方面存在重大差异。西方QE是在经济状况差、货币工具已用尽的情况下进行的；且不限制具体使用领域，只是压低普通融资基准利率，让市场来选择。

[6]：medium-term lending facility（中期贷款）

中期借贷便利（Medium-term Lending Facility，MLF）。2014年9月，中国人民银行创设了中期借贷便利(Medium-term Lending Facility，MLF)。中期借贷便利是中央银行提供中期基础货币的货币政策工具，对象为符合宏观审慎管理要求的商业银行、政策性银行，采取质押方式发放，并需提供国债、央行票据、政策性金融债、高等级信用债等优质债券作为合格质押品。

中国央行2014年11月6日表示，今年九月创设了中期借贷便利（MLF)，并于9、10两月通过该工具向银行体系投放总计7695亿基础货币。此外央行还证实通过抵押补充贷款工具(PSL)为开发性金融支持棚户区改造提供长期资金。此前媒体曾多次报道央行创设新工具释放流动性，但对工具类型却众说纷纭，今日谜底终于揭晓。

央行还证实，今年9月和10月，通过中期借贷便利向国有商业银行、股份制商业银行、较大规模的城市商业银行和农村商业银行等分别投放基础货币5000亿元和2695亿元，期限均为3个月，利率为3.5%, 在提供流动性的同时发挥中期政策利率的作用，引导商业银行降低贷款利率和社会融资成本，支持实体经济增长。

[7]：interbank rate（银行同业拆借利率）

银行同业拆借利率指的是银行同业之间的短期资金借贷利率。它有两个利率，拆进利率表示银行愿意借款的利率；拆出利率表示银行愿意贷款的利率。一家银行的拆进（借款）实际上也是另一家银行的拆出（贷款）。同一家银行的拆进和拆出利率的利差就是银行的收益。

同业拆借是指商业银行之间利用资金融通过程的时间差、空间差、实际差来调剂资金而进行的短期借贷。

同业拆借利率，也可表示为：+0.5%，是表示在拆借率的基础上加上50个基点，Basis Point (BP) 基点；点子一个基点等于一个百分点（%）的百分之一。

外币贷款和人民币贷款不同，人民币贷款利率都是人民银行统一规定的，不会因市场的改变而改变，直到人民银行公布新的贷款利率为止。而外币贷款都是以银行拆借率+基点